The afternoon of Sunday 16th October a Cessna 172 crashed in mountainous terrain of northern Peloponnese, Greece.
Registration: 5B-CLB
Operator: West Greece Aeroclub http://airclubwestgreece.gr/?page_id=8
The location of the crash is at elevation of 4,820 ft. and the peak of the mount Helmos, 3.5 nm to the south is 7,680 ft.
The flight was a training sortie from Athens Megara LGMG and back.
Both occupants died on the scene from the fire that followed the crash.
From first pictures is appears that the control surfaces were on the aircraft at the time of impact.
http://www.tempo24.gr/eidisi/95274/to-simeio-tis-tragodias-deite-apokleistikes-fotografies-apo-tin-periohi-poy-synetrivi
I also flew from Megara LGMG on the day and time of accident but not over Peloponnese where it took place.
The weather in central/southern Greece was unusually humid. Lots of moisture in the atmosphere with locally reduced visibility (5~8,000m) in areas where the moisture mass was “squeezed” or elevated by terrain.
There were unusual (for Greece) small localized overcast areas with bases at 1500 ft. and tops at 2500 ft.
The most reliable (non aviation specific) forecaster in Greece shows after 5:20 here! , 2 days before the accident, a humid mass expected to move eastbound over Peloponnese on the afternoon of the accident.
The instructor was an experienced pilot having flown many types of fixed wing and rotary aircraft in all kind of operations from Aerobatics to Air Force Search and Rescue.
His credentials (from newspaper article).
Civil Aviation Licenses
2015 – 2016 Tuna Pilot, Hansen Helicopters
2014–2015 Aerobatic instructor, 3fly, Bad Voslau
2011-2015 Instructor & C.G.I, Dekeleia F/C
2011-2013 Instructor, Maveric Aviation Megara Gr
2010–2011 Instructor, Mesogeion F/C Tatoi Gr
2008 Parachuter’s Pilot, Megara F/C, Gr
2007 – 2015 Co-pil AS-332, H.A.F Elefsis AFB Gr
2006 – 2007 T-2 C/E Buckeye P/O, 362 SQN Kalamata AFB Gr
Civil Aviation Licenses
2013 ATPL Bridge Course
2013 IR
2013 AOPA UK Competition Aerobatic, Intermediate, Standard, Basic
2011 Flight Instructor Helicopters
2011 Cirrus Transition Course
2010 Flight Instructor Ultralight airplanes
2010 Robinson Safety Course
2010 CPL/ME/FI
2009 CPL(H)
2007 PPL(H)
2002 PPL(A)
Military Aviation Licenses
2013 Air Accident Investigation School, Dekeleia AFB
2010 Advanced Maritime Survivor Course, Kalamata AFB,Gr
2010 Emergency Underwater Escape School (Helo Dunker), Hellenic Navy, Kotroni, Gr
2008 I.R (H)
2008 MCC
2008 Helicopter , Elefsis AB
2008 AS-332 Super Puma Pilot’s School
2008 Emergency Underwater Escape School (Helo Dunker),La Spezia, It
2007 CRM
2007 Flight physiology
2007 Bombardment & Dogfighting Training, T-2C/E Buckeye
2006 SMS course
2005 Advanced Training School on T-2C/E Buckeye
2004 Basic Training T-6A
2003 Maritime Survivor Course, Kalamata AFB, Gr
2003 Primary Training, T-41D
The accident got more media attention than usual because the instructor was until recently a pilot in the Air Force’s all weather Search and Rescue Super Puma helicopters unit.
The instructor was very active in public exposure with multimedia of his flying activity.
The result was that (as it seems up to now) people got split in two directions.
The elderly TV browsing and non aviation literate only and the younger people able to look around the Internet for more information.
The first group consider the instructor a lost hero who went up to the angels after having saved many lives with SAR operations in difficult conditions.
The second group is a bit confused because there is evidence the instructor was a risk taker but admittedly with experience in his back still though, a young and restless heart.
The instructor’s media:
http://www.instagram.com/sotirisflygare/
http://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=1363663041
http://www.youtube.com/user/SAntonopoulos/videos
Lots of (subjective) clues in there …
The instructor origin was from Kalavrita area of Peloponnese (just west of the accident site) and hence most people assume he considered this area his local area of which he obviously had good knowledge.
From his Videos:
R22 flying in year 2010 inside the (Faraggi Vouraikou) canyon 3nm northwest of the 2016 accident location.
R22 in same 2010 flight at the the Ski Resort car park (off season – its summer) 1.5nm south of the 2016 accident location.
It is an urban gossip that some aircraft wander around that area in the off season months when the car park is empty for some “tricks”.
Here’s an accident of an ultralight in the same location (abeam the car park) just 5 months after the above video where the two occupants got seriously injured.
http://drflight.blogspot.gr/2010/11/o.html
http://www.thebest.gr/news/index/viewStory/39418
In 2011 over north Athens, sitting on the copilots’ side of a C172 the instructor comments “so that you don’t say aircraft can’t hover”.
The accident location of 5B-CLB (roughly) at N38 01.51 E022 11.48
Screenshots are due North.
I intentionally do not want to comment on assumptions of probable cause etc. because this is the professionals’ job (AAIB in Greece https://www.aaiasb.gr/ ) who shall publish the report some year or two later.
Just for the record, I did not know any of the two occupants of the aircraft.
Tragic, especially for the student’s family and certainly also the aeroclub. As you imply, this sounds like one of those super-experienced skygods not taking light aircraft seriously any more. Let’s see what they find out.
Reminds me a bit of one well-known flying examiner in our region. Almost every student in southern Germany has taken at least one checkride with him during the last 15 years or so. He had been flying the F104 (and Tornado IIRC) in the german air force and was an airline captain thereafter. I took my IR instructor check with him. We flew from a VFR airfield, got our IFR pickup, I demonstrated some airwork and in ILS approach to him from the right hand seat, and then he said (we had flown IFR for maybe 15 minutes…): “I’ve seen enough, you passed. Now let’s cancel IFR again and I’ll show you how we flew in the airforce”. He firewalled the throttle of our Pa28 and he flew us home to our VFR airfield (in non-flat terrain…) never exceeding 50ft AGL. I was never so scared in all my flying. I heard from several other pilots that he did similar things during their checkrides. Later he totalled a Pa28 of our fleet during an IR checkride with another instructor in a forced landing due to an obscure engine failure (“seized carburetor float valve” is the official explanation, “fuel selector on the empty tank” the unofficial one). Last year he was finally killed in a lightplane crash. Some things seem to be inevitable.
It is tragic, I knew him, had flown with him and had talked to him, when flying and not. He would occasionally fly to LGMT with the Super Puma to bring somebody needing medical assistance from a nearby island or do a SAR mission (as he did one week before the crash). One time he talked to me via the huge helicopter speaker and I acknowledged from the Tower. He’d told me that he got dizzy when he’s walking, that’s how much he wanted to fly. On other occasions he would come to LGSK and, after he’d land on my shift, we would go out and drink mojitos. I also did a training flight with him once and was planning to take aerobatic lessons with him.
I studied the area of the crash and the landscape photographs and guessed that (if the photos are correct) he missed the small valley by 80-100 meters (there is a sharp cliff on one side, where the ski resort is). The ski resort has a rectangular parking area, 450m length, but is at 5500ft.
Very sad, especially on an instructional flight – hopefully the AAIASB will extract some lessons – the area looks quite unforgiving, presumably the flight may have being an introduction to mountain flying, not a PPL type flight.
I have just heard from a Greek local that this ex-military pilot, and an FI, did a touch and go in the car park mentioned above, and was unable to avoid the terrain afterwards, possibly due to a descending airflow.
Its a rumor circulating since the first day but unless someone saw them doing it (or recorded media from on board camera existed which would have leaked by now) there is no substance in such claims.
To rephrase it, it is highly probable but can not proven.
In this snapshot from the car park Robinson 22 video that the pilot had shot 6 years ago, I indicate the hill, 1.5nm to the north, just behind which the Cessna was found.
In 2010 if only he knew …
The final report: https://www.aaiasb.gr/imagies/stories/documents/07_2018_Final_Report_GR__5B-CLB.pdf (Can be translated using Google or similar tools)
The final path of the flight:
EDIT: @Dimme just saw that you posted while I was typing.
Almost two years after this accident took place the AAIB report was published this month.
The final report, in Greek language, for C712P aircraft 5B-CLB in KALAVRYTA mountainous area is published here: https://www.aaiasb.gr/en/publications/aaiasb-reports/2018-reports-en.html
It cites complacency on the CFI’s part.
There were no mechanical or other technical issues on the aircraft, the ATO (Flight School) had lots of misconduct in its paperwork, training procedures, bookkeeping etc. and the CAA had inadequate supervision of these procedures, but these were not contributing factors to the accident.
Fortunately, for the investigation, there was an action camera mounted in the aircraft cabin looking forward (including the instrument panel) which recorded every single detail of the last 2.5 minutes of the flight and the data card of it was retrieved by the AAIB unharmed.
[before you ask, no it has not leaked anywhere]
In short, the flight entered and got “boxed in” in a canyon 4.000 rising to 5.000 ft AMSL high.
They started recording with the on board action camera as they entered the canyon.
As terrain was approaching from below and the student was flying, the CFI picked the moment to grab his mobile phone and start shooting pictures getting (apparently) distracted from the upcoming dangerous trap.
By the time he (CFI) realized they may become boxed in, when the student actually indicated worry to him, he took control and started climbing with full throttle to avoid the upcoming peak of the box.
Mixture was at full rich during the whole flight.
He made a sharp climbing turn to the left for a U turn.
The turn was downwind from the prevailing mountain winds in that area.
The IAS reached 50Kts in that turn and the VSI +1000 climbing up to ~5.000ft MSL at an instant.
The altitude the aircraft reached was 350 ft. short of the peak ahead of them.
The aircraft stalled in a left spin and crashed violently nose down in sloped terrain that was ~500 ft. below them.
The two occupants perished instantly and a fire ensued immediately after the crash.
The graphs in the report show the vertical & lateral path of the flight in relation to the terrain below. Pages 15-16 (20-21 of the PDF).
Page 62 (67 of the PDF) is the Terrain vs Aircraft altitude graph.
Page 63 (68 of the PDF) is the track as extracted from the action camera (left) and the track recorded by ATC radar until signal lost (right).
The AAIB calculated that if the climb had started a minute earlier they should have marginally cleared the peak ahead of them.
The CFI was expert in aerobatics, with 4000+ hours in civil fixed wing propeller & helicopters and various Air Force (propeller, jet, helicopter) aircraft types, he knew the accident area quite well and these apparently contributed to the complacency he most probably felt about the path low in between these mountain peaks in the area.
What a pity.
I am thinking what to do I found myself in that situation. My first thought is:
- Full power climb, trading airspeed for altitude.
- As airspeed decreased below Vx, approach flap, approach airspeed (1,3*Vso) and a 45° banking U-turn. (Into wind, if possible.)
