Malibuflyer wrote:
The whole discussion is around that “chute is the only solution and we must forget all other options in case of an emergency as the chute is so great” opinion expressed by some.
That is not how Cirrus trains pilots, and you will not meet a properly Cirrus trained pilot who works on that principle.
The CAPS system has been incorporated into the Cirrus training ADM, it is a systematic approach to the mental process used by pilots to consistently determine the best course of action in response to a given set of circumstances.
Here is a flavour of the procedure as taught. It is the procedure that, if followed, results in the best possible outcome in the largest number of cases, and that is due to experience (as with much progress in transportation, it is derived from real accident data)
A) EFATO
1) 500’ AGL and Below: CAPS not a good option, land ahead with minimum maneuvering.
2) 500’ AGL to 2,000’ AGL: Use CAPS now!
Do not attempt to troubleshoot or turn back to the airport.
3) 2,000 AGL and above: Consider the CAPS right away, then troubleshoot.
DO NOT discard CAPS as an option even if it isn’t the first one.
B) Situations where the CAPS should be used when not necessarily close to the ground:
1) Any loss of control in flight: Verify control input won’t allow precise control, then pull the chute.
Do not fight with the airplane, speed may increase too rapidly to deploy even 10 seconds after control loss.
2) Loss of engine in IMC: Troubleshoot the engine, use residual airspeed to stay level until speed decays to best glide speed.
Do not descend! Use the CAPS if engine restart is not possible.
3) If ditching is inevitable: Glide as close to land as possible, then deploy CAPS at 2,000’ AGL.
Don but do not inflate survival equipment.
This gives a flavour of how proper training incorporates CAPS into the decision making process. As will all emergency and vital actions, it needs to be second nature to be effective. Hence a hard floor is set below which, if a forced landing is not assured, CAPS is pulled, but even then, it is up to the pilot’s discretion. For example, if you have an alligator infested swamp below you, it may be worth the risk of stretching the glide*
* this actually happened!
That doesn’t look too bad. Why haven’t some Cirrus pilot put that up earlier?
Pilot-H wrote:
if you have an alligator infested swamp below you, it may be worth the risk of stretching the glide
That depends on who you want to do a favor 
Pilot-H wrote:
Do not descend!
What you wrote makes much more sense than what some others posted here on Cirrus procedures. That sounds exactly like “Chute is one Option which is great in some and not so great in other situations – and therefore depending on the situation and time available to take a decision you should consider your options more or less thoroughly…”
The quoted part is the only one which I think is dangerous (but I trust that this is only due to the brevity of your quote). Of Course you can also lose height if you are IFR in IMC when the engine quits. You always have air below you – and the reason you know the grid altitude etc. is exactly that in case of emergency one quickly knows how much altitude one can lose before it gets unsafe.
Promoting such a “do not descend” would bear the risk that pilots stall their planes because they are anxious about losing altitude…
Steve6443 wrote:
AF447 was a perfect example of Lizard Brain. The PIC pulled the stick back and kept hauling back on the stick until impact even though the scenario for unreliable airspeed should have been a simple ‘fly pitch and power’ upset.
Actually they were flying pitch and power. IIRC from the accident report, most of the way down, the aircraft was at something like 12 degrees nose up and at takeoff power. Under normal circumstances, that would result in a normal climb away. What they didn’t ever get around to considering (perhaps because of lizard brain) was that in the stalled condition they were in, that pitch and power was never going to do anything for them and they had to lower the nose first and regain flying speed. Unfortunately, in the unexpected configuration they had got themselves into, the user interface became counter intuitive (the stall warner came on whenever they lowered the nose) which compounded matters.
Probably a better example of lizard brain is indeed in a Cirrus: there is an AOPA case study where a guy flies his family into IMC over Illinois. The pilot was advanced into his instrument training; he likely knew enough about the Cirrus autopilot that he could have put it into a mode where altitude and heading was maintained; he knew about the parachute, yet he still spiral dove into the ground killing everyone on board.
Malibuflyer wrote:
The quoted part is the only one which I think is dangerous (but I trust that this is only due to the brevity of your quote).
Indeed. Do not descend could be interpreted as “Do not descend below 500’ AGL” for all intents and purposes. However, there are several different models of Cirrus, and some will stall the aircraft if left in altitude-hold mode, others (with envelope protection) will descend once speed decays. Some will give a terrain warning, others won’t.
So the simplest “lizard brain” checklist response is therefore “do not descend” to avoid task saturated CFIT, and again, it is predicated on lots of actual GA accidents.
While it is sensible to finesse it if you have the mental capacity to glide to MDA+500 before pulling a chute, this is a vital action designed to minimise the risk that in a task-saturated emergency an aircraft falls from the bottom of the undercast under parachute rather than in a terminal spin. Again, it is training to avoid the worst general case.
We have various AF447 threads but 12 degrees UP pitch would not have done them much good at FL350. Those guys had no idea of pitch + power = performance. The only reason they got away with knowing so little about “flying” for so long is because the plane has loads of performance (all twin jets go like a rocket, due to OEI cert requirements), good ice protection etc, a good autopilot, and they flew very uniform mission profiles. This worked until something “new” happened…
I still think the Cirrus chute pulling advice treats pilots as really stupid people. It is probably justified in terms of minimising fatal crashes… at the cost of making the Cirrus community the butt of countless jokes and ridicule all over social media, as well as generating loads of uninsurable pilots, especially in Europe (who are hardly likely to write about it, let alone carrying on paying the $55 or whatever it costs to get into COPA).
Reality is a lot more varied. For example, in a SEP which – short of a Spirfire – is underpowered practically all the time, an engine failure coupled with trying to hold altitude will produce a stall (and in a Cirrus a rapid wing drop unless you are expecting it) in tens of seconds (or less depending on how long it takes you to notice) and then you are facing a pretty dramatic emergency on multiple fronts, probably with screaming passengers, etc.
Peter wrote:
at the cost of making the Cirrus community the butt of countless jokes and ridicule,
There are other reasons for the motivations for this… suffice to say that when I flew twins there was a similar trope amongst single engine pilots who would delight in explaining how “the second engine is only good for carrying you to the scene of an accident.”
as well as generating loads of uninsurable pilots, specially in Europe (who are hardly likely to write about it, let alone carrying on paying the $55 or whatever it costs to get into COPA).
So there are “loads of uninsurable pilots” that no one knows about because they are “hardly likely to write about it”…
Really? If that were true don’t you think insurers would front-load the premium on a Cirrus? (They don’t)
There is a worldwide fleet of over 7,000 Cirrus aircraft. There have been 93 CAPS deployments. Often, the aircraft will be rebuilt rather than written off. Often, the CAPS deployments will save insurance companies money – over the cost consequences of a fatal accident.
Is there any argument that could change your mind?
Those guys had no idea of pitch + power = performance.
Maybe. More important is how you use your knowledge. References to „Lizard Brain“ and startle effect have been made. I’m sure you know a lot about flying the TB20, and even more about pitch and power. That however doesn’t guarantee you will react correctly to any situation thrown at you, especially if it’s something you have never experienced before and you get contradicting inputs.
The only reason they got away with knowing so little about “flying” for so long is because the plane has loads of performance (all twin jets go like a rocket, due to OEI cert requirements),
Loads of performance? At FL350? If the plane would have had loads of performance it would have climbed to space („like a rocket“), right?
good ice protection etc,
Yes, apart from the (obviously deemed uncritical/ sarcasm) pitot static system that failed because of ICE crystals.
a good autopilot,
So good that it failed immediately.
and they flew very uniform mission profiles. This worked until something “new” happened…
Yes, airline flying is pretty standardized. That doesn’t mean it’s simple.
All the points you raise are actually the recipe for such a disaster:
Force advanced automation without adapted training (cut costs)
„Discourage“ manual flying/training (cut costs)
Fly with faulty equipment (cut costs)
I agree that basic flying skills suffer tremendously in longhaul airline ops. To change that would cost money for effective training.
I still never understand the obsession with some people and Cirrus pilots. It is just a plane, and a very successful one. In my experience, their pilots are no worse, or better, than the general owner pilot population. In general, owner pilots are not great and this is reflected in the accident stats.
Airline ops are much safer and going on about AF is just taking a single complex example and overplaying it.
The Cirrus bashing turned into mostly sarcasm nowadays, to the amusement of Cirrus owners, ok a few hardliners/haters remain but that’s seen as pathetic and not taken seriously.
I never heard about problems regarding insurance and Cirrus in europe.
