At this moment I were in Dinard (on the ground) and I can confirm the bad weather. However they were experienced, so we can imagine an instrument or engine failure, which is often fatal in IMC at low altitude.
Very sad news…
For French readers (but not overly complicated language so GCSE French and Google translate should cope)
https://www.bea.aero/uploads/tx_elydbrapports/BEA2018-0830.pdf local copy
Left seat pilot with no IR rating
Right seat pilot with IR but not current with actual IMC and not PBN trained (they did the RNAV35)
Possibly the DI was not slaved and had drifted.
Thanks. Interesting to note that (according to the report, not checked myself) the TB20 flight manual actually prescribes that a one pilot must sit in the left seat. NOT the case in most other AFMs.
But, either way, the flight was dodgy. And I assume that every day, many such flights take place where the “owner” does not fufil some requirement to legally do the flight and hence “takes along” somebody who does.
Xtophe wrote:
Right seat pilot with IR but not current with actual IMC and not PBN trained (they did the RNAV35)
France has the same PBN exemption until Aug2020 as well?
According to an examiner, the RHS is «pilote IFR de beau temps» (translation VMC IFR pilot) with no instructor rating, not sure what was his role in the flight? especially as weather conditions were hard-core (+ unfamiliar airfield, gps approach, no auto-pilot…)
Ibra wrote:
France has the same PBN exemption until Aug2020 as well?
Actually, the French PBN course I took told me that in France, there was a national rule that one had to be PBN-trained to operate RNP approaches even before it became an EASA obligation.
As I said at the beginning, I was on a training flight in Rennes (30 Nm from Dinard) when it happened.
The weather was less difficult there but the visibility and the ceiling were limited.
Even on LPV approach it is not sure that at the minimum the runway was visible at Dinard at the time of the approach.
I wonder how two pilots with more than 2,500 hours of flight time could do such a thing ?
Here is a translation of the conclusion:
Scenario
The occupants of the aircraft were on a flight from Laval, where the aircraft was based in Dinard, with no compelling objective to get there and no time constraints.
particular. They have known each other for several years and fly regularly together.
The weather conditions over Brittany are improving after a covered morning, especially in Laval, which is accessible. A cloudy layer However, the Dinard sector is still in the process of being developed.
The co-owner in the right-hand seat ensures the radio communications for the duration of the flight. As a result of its placement on the aircraft, it is likely that the co-owner in the left seat is at the controls for a large portion of the flight.
On contact with the approach to Rennes, the controller gives clearance for an RNAV 35 approach. The pilot in the right-hand seat reads back correctly without ask for an alternative to this procedure, although neither pilot is trained for this type of operation. The investigation could not determine whether they were following the GNSS approach or the VOR approach.
When the pilot begins his descent on final, the aircraft drifts to the left of the centreline, may be wind-induced or due to course drift related to the position of the directional gyro mode selector switch. The aircraft is now high on the glide path.
Approximately two minutes later, at a height of approximately 1500 feet, the aircraft penetrates the cloud layer. The pilot appears to be correcting the deviations on the axis and the plane. The aircraft is then close to the published trajectory. In the same time, the controller gives landing clearance.
The investigation could not determine precisely what happened between that moment and the moment the aircraft hits the treetops.
When the aircraft exits the cloud layer, the available height does not allow for to avoid collision with trees.
It could not be determined with certainty who was flying the aircraft during this phase of flight.
Assuming that the co-owner in the left seat was at the controls, the lack of IFR qualification did not provide the necessary guarantees for proper monitoring of the approach without external reference. In the event that the co-owner in right-hand seat was at the controls, his limited recent experience, particularly in flight, and his without an outside reference, as well as its placement on the plane, made it difficult the pursuit of a stabilized approach. In addition, not being trained in approaches using the RNAV/GNSS source, the performance of such a procedure may have increased considerably his workload.
The investigation could not explain the position of the FREE/SLAVE selector.
Contributing Factors
May have contributed to the collision with the vegetation:
Safety lessons
RNAV (GNSS) approaches can provide a sense of ease. The monitoring of the trajectory on the horizontal plane may indeed seem simpler. The pilot must however always ensure a control of the plan and the piloting of the aircraft. These points as well as additional skills are covered in the training on procedures PBN.
In a given operational situation, qualifications are a prerequisite.
However, only skills, recent experience and a relevant risk analysis are able to guarantee a sufficient level of safety.
Translated with www.DeepL.com/Translator (free version)
(edit : presentation)
Thanks for the translation.
FWIW, I think they hit the ground because they messed up something on the avionics, and eventually ended up too low relative to terain (that’s obvious I know).
The reasons listed are just ritual stuff; no attempt was made to find out what actually happened. This is normal with GA accidents (no FDR, no CVR). Did they try to download logs from any avionics? BEA’s view is “flying is dangerous”.
The “the right co-owner’s lack of training in PBN operations;” is particularly nonsensical. Anybody who knows how to fly a GPS track and knows how to configure their “boxes” can fly a GPS approach. The PBN training is just European gold plating, intended to support the FTO industry and one of a million measures brought in after GPS caused the bottom to fall out of the navigation market. It was never required in the US where there is 10x more GA activity than in Europe.
RVR limits aside, there is nothing wrong with attempting an IAP even if very likely below minima. If you get visual with the required portions of the runway environment before the DH you are good to land. Obviously it may be prudent to execute an early diversion if it looks bad, but if you have plenty of fuel, why not give it a go?
Peter wrote:
Did they try to download logs from any avionics?
They mentioned they tried to access the memory of the tablet of the left seat pilot. But it was too damaged in the crash.
