UK participants sought for a CAS infringement study

@MikeE The error you are doing, research vise, is you are basing your whole research on an assumption. And it’s not even an assumption, it is more like a personal feeling, a hunch, an opinion or whatever. There are no reason whatsoever to design your research around this assumption, none. You may of course have your personal reasons, an agenda. In that case this is no research producing usable results. This is more of a newspaper article for your agenda, disguised as “serious” university research. Also, the way you are writing and arguing, lots of rhetoric about your assumption, but no facts, not even plausible reasoning.

Secondly, lots and lots of work has been done regarding pilot errors in GA. maybe not in the UK (I don’t know about the UK), but world wide. The FAA and the NTSB have produced valuable results, and these results have been put to use. The same goes for other countries. The results are always the same. The only way to reduce pilot errors, is to apply meaningful training on those areas where training is needed, together with focusing on those aspects in the GA media and by the authorities.

Pilots don’t fly around with a death wish. Pilots don’t fly around with a hidden psychological urge to do errors. It is somewhat astonishing you seem to think this is the case. But you know what? I have seen this line of argument and thinking before, not often, but still. Private GA is risky. To think otherwise is a dangerous fallacy. To think that the inherent risk of private GA doesn’t also attract certain people, is also a dangerous fallacy. Those who actively fly year after year, and haven’t given up, are those who know how to handle risk. They know how to handle risk not only on a “tactical” level (everyday flying), but also on a personal level. The “survivors” are the ones who know their limits, and continuously adapt/improve/change their flying/procedures/aircraft accordingly as time passes along. This requires an inherent thirst for knowledge and information. You never stop learning. The “survivors” are the true GA pilots. They are the ones who keep everything running. In any case, handling of risk is a key element, probably the only element worth mentioning.

There are several personal aspects of risk. One such aspect is to “look good” or act professional in the eyes of your peers. Busting airspace doesn’t make you look good, and as we all know by now, in the UK it can also be a very unpleasant and costly experience. It could put an end to your flying altogether. Hence, this risk is very true, very real, and goes way beyond merely “looking good”. It is existential, on the same level as fatality. How would a “survivor” handle this risk? Well, he/she will adapt to it, take it into consideration and change flying habits accordingly. From what I gather from the other looong thread, the only sensible thing is to fly elsewhere, or fundamentally change the way flying is done, so the whole reason for flying there in the first place is gone. It’s like a big snowstorm has appeared in the sky, and it’s not going away, it’s permanent. Only fools fly into snowstorms VFR in a small SEP, only fools. The risk is too high, and there is no adequate means of mitigating the risk, unless also removing the reason for flying there in the first place.

You have lost perspective completely IMO. The point is not what errors a pilot does to get busted. The point (in the UK I must emphasize), is what has gone wrong with a pilot’s ability to handle risk, what has gone wrong with fundamental airmanship, if he (still) flies in airspaces that are as risky as a snowstorm.

What you are saying is in essence just nonsense. But I have seen all this before. IMO (and I must emphasize it’s my opinion, I’m no psychologist). The reason for such nonsense is, maybe not the inability as such, but at least the unwillingness to handle risk due to the consequences. I have seen this in fellow pilots. After maybe 5-10 years in the game, you will start to realize that this is a dangerous hobby. After 20-30 years you can count more fellow pilots/friends that has died while flying GA than in any other activity you can think of, including car accidents and whatnot. Some cannot cope with this. This is fine, nothing wrong with that. Lots of other hobbies to pursuit. But, it doesn’t change the fact that the only thing to do is to handle the risk in a proper manner. We need more of what works, and less of what doesn’t work.

MikeE I do hope you get volunteers, happy to discuss over the ’phone.

Kahnemann and Tversky designed the first multi crew programmes for Delta in the early 1990’s, and the understanding of behavioural errors and biases owes a lot to their pioneering work. Despite the Israeli Defence Forces overhauling their officer training with the assistance of them, it is interesting that some of the historic methods inherited, and discarded, are still being used in the UK, although I believe their work (Kahnemann et al) is studied in staff colleges.

There is still a lot to understand why we do certain things, and keep doing them in the cockpit.

MikeE wrote:

I am surprised, though, that you feel that understand pilot error is irrelevant to safe flying

I never said that, rather the opposite. But when you say pilot error, you don’t mean pilot error as in CFIT and similar (which kills almost every time). You mean “pilot error” related to some behavioral attributes that prevents a pilot from obeying the rules, as in getting busted (or not). These are very different things, different mechanisms, different solutions (probably). Yet, this doesn’t seem to be of any concern to you or your research. What exactly is it you are trying to find out? and for what purpose?

CFIT can be seen as lack of skills, lack of currency, lack of understanding of the physics of flight (on a practical and theoretical level), lack of focus/concentration. Busting airspace can be seen as lack of discipline – at best. Exactly how are these aspects related?

In any case, the best tool a pilot has, is to know his/hers own skills and limitations, and use that in handling the risks of flying. A lack of this knowledge or skill if you want, is one major pilot error that cannot be fixed, not by anything, that’s the nature of GA, at least private GA. So, given the very possible outcome of losing your license if you fly VFR in certain airspaces in the UK. An outcome that is 100% certain if you fly there enough (it’s just a matter of time, as it seems looking at the “other” thread), then the only real pilot error is to fly in that airspace VFR. If you chose to fly there, you have already crossed the line, you have surrendered to pure luck and prayers. Anything happening while flying there is therefore irrelevant. How do you handle this pilot error?

And you don’t know how long I have been flying or had an interest in aviation. Another assumption?

Did I assume anything in that direction? Not that I can see. I only pointed out you have lost the perspective (IMO of course).

Look. The other thread about busting is a “shake head in disbelief”-thread for anyone flying in the rest of Europe (not UK). And that is a fact. And now this thread pops up, where you say that busting airspaces are only caused by pilot error We don’t have an airspace busting problem, never did, never will. Yes, there are some busting going on here and there, but as a dangerous problem, or rather a could be problem, it is already solved. We have implemented mechanisms, awareness and training, so the problem is contained, kept to a minimum. This is not exactly correct, because we had everything in place long before airspace busting became part of the vocabulary. It is done with no fees, no threats of losing licenses, no threats of courts, no mandatory (and costly) training courses, no psychological babble about pilot error, no need for moving map GPS even (although it makes life much easier). Solved by magic AKA common sense

Anyway, good luck with your research.

To go through some (I have other things to do) of your points in the order they are raised…

Sadly, that is enough to doubt the seriousness of this study.

It’s been posted before: Let’s get rid of the bad pilots by Sidney Dekker (pdf link).

local copy

MikeE wrote:

but what would the public and official response have been if he had done exactly as he did but something in the water had caused the aircraft to somersault, with the loss of all or some of the souls on board. An interesting question.

Something tells me you’re not here to understand people, you’re here to understand how to regulate people.

There are big variations in how user friendly light aircraft cockpits are, and in how well the aircraft can be trimmed. With less than 40 hours on it, I can trim the Bolkow Junior hands-off, but after over 1500 hours on 3 Jodel DR1050s I’ve never managed to trim one for any length of time in calm air.
Setting a keyboard transponder, compared to a single knob, with a press to set digit, then setting the next digit, for example.