That would be exactly my experience.
I havent read the report in detail yet, but would be surprised if the conclusion were otherwise.
I think the question is whether ‘the effects’, which one can certainly feel, include cognitive impairment as argued by the defence.
It’s quite a flimsy defence – basically saying that X could have happened, you can’t categorically rule it out, and therefore must acquit. It violates Occam’s Razor in my view, and the more likely explanation requiring the fewest additional assumptions is that he simply pushed the boundaries once too often.
The precedent that the successful defence sets is a troubling one for me. Even if we accept the cognitive impairment, one cannot get away from the fact that such impairment, or at least the G force that caused it, was intentionally self-inflicted. It’s a bit like saying that if you get drunk you’re not responsible for your actions.
I think most people think the defence was flimsy, and I do too (because, for a start, the pilot had ample opportunities to know the maneuver was not gonna work and at each juncture presumably decided to continue) but that is how criminal law works… Acquittal → Innocent of the charge. Juries tend to be drawn from lower socio-economic groups because the smarter people tend to get out of what might be a loooong case (they tend to have more obligations, holidays, etc, booked in advance). If I was sued by the CAA (or anyone else for that matter) I would be quite happy if Vlad the Impaler QC got me off the hook and everybody hated me for engaging him in my defence.
Graham wrote:
Even if we accept the cognitive impairment, one cannot get away from the fact that such impairment, or at least the G force that caused it, was intentionally self-inflicted. It’s a bit like saying that if you get drunk you’re not responsible for your actions.
That is an interesting argument.
I am not sure about the analogy.
You know you have consumed too much alcohol, or you did at one point before you became paralytic and collapsed, in one sense it is premeditated.
You should know the risk of grey out, spatial disorientation etc., but I dont think it is fair to say it is something you can predict with certainty, and therefore the action and consequence cannot be premeditated.
I have been reasonably aero fit and unexpectedly had a real sense of the nuaseau and tunnel vision that sometimes results for no apparent reason. Could I have averted that happening by not flying? I think not, because I had no reason to believe I wasnt fit to fly.
Something at the back of my mind makes me think the pilot may have had a bad cold on the day (I am sorry if I am wrong). Anyway, regardless, and therefore maybe hypothetically, we are trained to assess our own medical fitness before we fly. If we fly when unfit that could have premeditated consequences.
I guess anyone that has flown on instruments will know the onset of the leans, again usually for no apparent reason. It is not dissimiliar, except when up side down pulling G things happen quite quickly and you dont have the same time to tell yourself not to be so stupid and focus on the instruments. In other words it is easy to make decisions with time on your side AND sound cognitive abilities, not so easy when you are suddenly sweating, feel nauseous, your vision is tunneling and you are fighting not to pass out.
All that said, when we do more dangerous stuff, we should be even more aware of the dangers, ensuring our training is current and adequate etc.
For me this is far more a case of we shall never know what was really going on in those moments and therefore the benefit of the doubt is the correct result. If there is culpability it should rest with whether the pilot was aware of any good reasons for not carrying out the display on the day, and those who were charged with assessing the pilots display competance, and stop call, before and during the display. (and I make no comment on whether or not this responsibility was discharged as I dont know enough about the events).
On the contrary, I think we know exactly what was going on in the cockpit in this case. The manoeuvre, indeed the whole flight was recorded in intimate detail via GoPro footage. The defence claimed that the pilot was suffering from some form of ‘cognitive impairment’ from a point at the end of the Derry Turn and before commencement of the pull up into the final loop. The GoPro footage indicated the pilot continued to make positive inputs and movements throughout the manoeuvre including a glance down at the altimeter approaching the apex, followed by selection of additional flap just through the apex. The defence suggested that the pilot was somehow cognitively impaired in the execution of all these functions since multiple indications throughout the manoeuvre indicated it could never be completed successfully. For me the most telling indication that the pilot was not cognitively impaired was almost identical footage of the same manoeuvre in the previous year which when played side by side were almost exactly the same with reference to the smallest of movements and input by the pilot with obvious exemption that in 2014 the profile of the aircraft and associated cockpit indications and visual cues indicated that although not optimal, the manoeuvre was achievable.
Fuji_Abound wrote:
All that said, when we do more dangerous stuff, we should be even more aware of the dangers, ensuring our training is current and adequate etc
I agree completely with Fuji_Abound, grey out occurs sometimes without notice and with experienced pilots. It does have a pronounced cognitive effect.
This point on currency is key – given the cost of operating vintage jets it is unlikely that a pilot can remain current without a much more sustained training programme. How often did the training require to carry out an escape manoeuvre at different points in the sequence, for example?
Real currency would allow initiating an escape manoeuvre without hesitation on the onset of grey out.
I havent seen the footage, so I cant comment.
From my own experience, many of the motor skills of flying aeros become engrained after a while, so may be reasonably carried out, despite the pilot not being fully aware that some other action is required. In my own small way I have sat next to a pilot who continued to carry out the same spin recovery actions even though they werent working, and even though he knew what he should do in the alternative.
I would be interested to hear Roberts views, or the views of other pilots than have flown and taught aeros.
RobertL18C, I think if you read the relevant reports you will quickly appreciate that your points are unlikely to have been applicable to the incident under discussion
Flying aerobatics particularly show and low level aerobatics is an A game deal. An aerobatic routine flown with a base of 800 feet is entirely different from flying with a 100’ base. If the pilot had a cold, headache, sickness, then the routine is cancelled. There is and should be no debate on this. If the pilot was lucid and fit, then an error occurred within the routine. Either an aircraft malfunction, the report suggests there was nothing wrong with the aircraft performance, or an error on the part of the pilot for whatever reason.
In this case with tragic consequence.
The venue was interesting. Coastal location, (sea breeze), warm humid day (thermal activity), therefore the pilot should have expected variable conditions on arrival at the display line. I have taken off from the base airfield, flown 3 miles to the display, arrived at the venue and the conditions have been entirely different. That requires a quick mindset adjustment.
My Display Authorisation sanctioned my display down to 100 feet, and believe me life gets interesting at that level. Constant attention and adjustment is required to take into account the conditions, therefore no amount of engrained motor skills are going to keep you safe without SA. One point I would like to highlight is display line discipline. It is engrained in every pilot that the display line/crowd line cannot be bust. Flying over the crowd ends your display career. This has caused a lot of cockpit excitement in the past because the natural instinct is to ‘’pull’ if a crowd line infringement looks likely. That can end badly.
One should of course break away and end the routine. Of course this is easier said than done.
BeechBaby wrote:
I have taken off from the base airfield, flown 3 miles to the display, arrived at the venue and the conditions have been entirely different. That requires a quick mindset adjustment.
That is absolutely right, and a coastal venue, such as this, can see a susbtantial change in the weather in minutes.BeechBaby wrote:
If the pilot had a cold, headache, sickness, then the routine is cancelled.
I think that isnt a bad idea, even with a higher base. All these impact on performance substantially in my experience.
