Probably an appropriate point to mention Auto GCAS then.
http://aviationweek.com/technology/auto-gcas-saves-unconscious-f-16-pilot-declassified-usaf-footage
172driver wrote:
Well, why don’t you ask your specialists how they are going to deal with ongoing maintenance (of which there is a fair bit) on a ship without crew?
You don’t need a high cost captain, first officer, etc etc to “do maintenance”. I agree though, maintenance seems like an issue, but nothing that a “janitor” or two couldn’t solve.
what_next wrote:
If a pilotless plane is safer than one with pilots (of which I am, repeating myself…, absolutely convinced) then there will be fewer accidents and less cost.
It was obvious that MH370 was probably a suicide case, from the start.
But as with Germanwings there is no solution to this.
As there is no solution to sabotaging a pilotless plane.
Peter wrote:
But as with Germanwings there is no solution to this.
There is a solution to (almost) everything. Modern FBW planes are, under normal circumstances, able to protect themselves from pilots trying to exceed the normal flying envelope. They have a ground proximity warning system installed. All that’s required is a (software) connection between GPWS and envelope protection. E.g. by pulling up on it’s own if the crew does not react to a GPWS warning within a specified amount of time.
Shorrick_Mk2 wrote:
Probably an appropriate point to mention Auto GCAS then.
You just beat me to it…… quite impressive.
Peter wrote:
Formal methods do not work for nontrivial projects.
Of course they do. Cost involved is often an issue.
Peter wrote:
Well, they can be applied but they don’t result in zero bugs. Look at the B787 which will get a stoppage of both engines after several hundred days of on time. I bet formal methods were used there.
Software I use would have found that one (and it wouldn’t even need a formal specification, arithmetic overflows are by default treated as undesirable). Well, unless I decided it wasn’t desirable to check for it. Otherwise it would have “forced” me to account for that possibility. The issue with this approach is that you can have a significant amount of additional code.
LeSving wrote:
Yes, but at some point the logics of hubs makes no sense anymore. Travelling 2-3 times the needed distance, using 4-6 times the hours, is no recipe for good fuel economy and less maintenance costs. It’s certainly a waste of crew time, and cost.
An airline doesn’t have to care as long as you pay for it. If there are enough passengers to sustain a direct line, someone can open it. Smaller jets are available, not to mention turboprops which should be more efficient. We’re back at the “how big a portion of the costs are the pilots?” And how would it effect the economy of such a direct line to cut them out.
172driver wrote:
whereas Airbus decided they needed to sink some billions into a prestige four-holer. Which is dying.
Well, they started in the 80s (the official announcement was I think in 1990). A long, long time ago. And I think it’s a good machine for transcontinental work between major cities.
LeSving wrote:
There is no idea going slower because crew cost would eat up the potential saving.
You’re forgetting the customer. Customers want speed and are often willing to pay for it. Yes, ships are slow, but how much lower speed would customers be willing to accept? In the end, how much would your bottom line improve by having slower ships (as customers would want to pay less for slower service)?
what_next wrote:
E.g. by pulling up on it’s own if the crew does not react to a GPWS warning within a specified amount of time.
All you have to do then is fly low (where consumption is high) and wait for the fuel to run out. Really, by the time you create a plane that can protect itself from any attack by malicious pilots, you would have a plane that doesn’t need pilots. If you gave them any tool that would allow them to override the computer in case it did something wrong, it could be abused and used to crash the plane. At best both pilots (or a pilot plus someone else, say a purser) would be required so you would need two mad mans on board instead of one (but it creates the possibility that one tricks the other and then incapacitates him, especially if the other person isn’t a pilot and doesn’t understand the systems well; PS: or simply seizes an opportunity when the system genuinely acts up).
Software I use would have found that one (and it wouldn’t even need a formal specification, arithmetic overflows are by default treated as undesirable). Well, unless I decided it wasn’t desirable to check for it. Otherwise it would have “forced” me to account for that possibility. The issue with this approach is that you can have a significant amount of additional code.
Fortunately a theory is demolished by contrary empirical evidence 
Peter wrote:
Fortunately a theory is demolished by contrary empirical evidence
In scientific terms, yes (and I realize I am taking you out of context)….but as humans unfortunately we are capable of hanging on to the most fantastical stories, myths and beliefs in the face of sometimes overwhelming negative empirical evidence…such cognitive dissonance means we develop ever more complex justifications for maintaining the original premise…
There are many such religious beliefs in aviation….like turning out of the wind or stabilized approaches are holy… perhaps having a machine devoid of such religious predisposition make the decisions is ultimately what will make flying safer…
May have been posted but an on topic article in this week’s Economist
