Hi JasonC,
The report can only mention that of which they are absolutely certain. There is nobody/nothing to corroborate some of what I told the board – thus it cannot be included.
Hence, there is much more but it’s not in the report.
Hi Sam,
appreciate that you get involved! Obviously everybody understands that an official accident report is a formal document that follows strict regulations, etc.
The core question to you would be: Is there anything beyond what we can read in the accident report, that is useful for us as (Malibu-)Pilots to learn and to avoid similar mistakes in the future?
Sam_Rutherford wrote:
The report can only mention that of which they are absolutely certain. There is nobody/nothing to corroborate some of what I told the board – thus it cannot be included.
That isn’t correct. They would normally mention a material claim even if they have no corroboration. They may not accept it but they would mention it. So please just tell us what is left out.
I’m sure I’ve read plenty of reports that contain observations and comments from people that can’t be corroborated.
If there’s information that changes the way the report reads it’d certainly be good to know.
Sam_Rutherford wrote:
Hence, there is much more but it’s not in the report.
Obviously the PIC was responsible for the flight but why fly this leg VFR so low with a PA46? I would not even have considered this as an option on my crossings so far for many more reasons than just terrain.
Was the aircraft HF equiped? If not how did ATC approve such a low altitude on this leg? I remember they insist on a position report at HOIST…
I’ll try to answer as fully as I can.
1. I believe our CRM and cockpit gradient was all wrong. Two experienced pilots. One with more handling experience of the aeroplane and the route, the other with more systems experience of the aeroplane and the owner of the aircraft, alternating PIC. A poor mix, with both of us relying more on the other than had either of us been alone or with an inexperienced pilot.
2 & 3. Actually, no – the report only contains that which is absolutely certain.
4. We were VFR as we were deliberately staying low (and VMC) to avoid very strong headwinds at higher altitudes.
Whilst I cannot say for certain, I believe that we were VMC when we crashed – but that the visual cues had disappeared (no trees on just that hill). In the same way you can legally do “actual” IMC training with a VFR aircraft on a high overcast night over the desert. Visibility can be 9999, but there’s nothing to see (no stars, no ground lights, all black). The lack of terrain on the aircraft systems was clearly a contributory factor. An upload had been attempted earlier, but with the result that the old database had been erased and the new one had not ‘taken’ – leaving no terrain in the system (neither old nor new). I know nothing more about this process.
Thanks for being so open!
I believe the point on “CRM” is actually a very valid one – and extremely relevant for many of us.
It’s far to tempting to think “we are two experienced pilots so we are much safer than one of us alone” while for us recreational pilots (which have never had a multi-crew course and do not follow structured multi crew procedures) actually the opposite is often the case: I had several situations flying with an experienced friend when I thought “I’m not 100% sure if I’m just doing the right thing but if I didn’t the other one would jump in to help/correct me”. That creates a dangerously wrong sense of safety…
I believe our CRM and cockpit gradient was all wrong
Multi crew operate in very tight SOPs with a clear system of communication, typically close to word perfect. In a big airline base it is unlikely that a flight deck crew fly together more than once or twice a year, hence the need for high standardisation and standards. That both crew members are fully aware of what the plan is, and in particular TEM actions, are covered by clear, set briefs.
GA would probably benefit from MCC training even though operations are mainly single pilot. Knowing how to give taxi, departure, top of descent briefs, abnormal condition situational briefs/decisions would help single pilot operations.
Would this flight have had the same outcome if the two pilots had MPL experience?
Thanks for your input.
Were you carrying any other gps devices with terrain, something akin to a tablet with skydemon?
I must admit, if I was paying for a ferry pilot who was sat in the LHS, I’d have pretty high expectations for them, Particularly knowing what was safe to set off on the route. Then again perhaps that would be my mistake for having that expectation.
Good point Malibu.
It isn’t easy but essential to distinguish between relying on vs. supporting each other. Shared responsibility doesn’t work well in a cockpit, as it produces “riskier” behavior. Shared capacity/resources on the other hand can increase safety.
In a professional environment it is understood that all things are worthy of being mentioned. Nobody is left feeling stupid. Obviously this would be the ideal situation and as we are humans 100% isn’t achievable.
One of the easiest (maybe not for all) and paramount things to learn in a cockpit is to say “thank you” and not personally grudge.
250hr FO: check speed
27000hr Captain: thank you aka “correcting speed”
60hr private pilot / right seat: we are quite close for base/final turn aren’t we?
2000hr private pilot / PIC (task saturated): uhm naah we’ll make it I did this many times no problem
