Rwy20 wrote:
A French meteorologist told me a few weeks ago that VV is never reported in France. Don’t know why exactly.
Would be interesting to know how they do their LVP’s then.
Yesterday I had a similar weather situation at ZRH where the visibility was between 1500 and even 5000 m but cloud below 200 ft frequently. SCT001 BKN002 with met vis well above CAT I still is very borderline for an approach but perfectly legal per se as only RVR counts for that. But in the situation in Basel yesterday, VV/// sais exactly nothing whereas a reported VV of say 100 ft would certainly have given the pilot valuable information.
It’s also not that difficult to do, surely for an international airport these days there are ceilometers installed… they do measure the VV very accurately.
Mooney_Driver wrote:
VV/// sais exactly nothing whereas a reported VV of say 100 ft
VV/// typically means too low to measure, and hence below 100ft. I would definitely interpret it that way, and forget about an approach even if RVR is looking ok.
This weather is consistent with fog that has just started to lift, i.e., RVR is improving, but you still have a layer of pea-soup which starts at 30-50ft and hasn’t formed a distinguishable cloud layer yet. I would guess that, if the fog lifted that day, it would go to BKN001 —> BKN/SCT002 —> CAVOK if early enough.
A French meteorologist told me a few weeks ago that VV is never reported in France. Don’t know why exactly.
It is perhaps a policy to maintain an expeditious flow of airtraffic into highly frequented airports with CAT II/ III equipment. Experience has shown that under RVR conditions better than 1200m you will have the approach lights/ runway lights in sight at the CAT I minimum (200ft height) in 99% of all cases even when the ceilometer reports a 100ft ceiling.
A normal pilot not aware of the above mentioned fact would always request a CAT II/ III approach with a 100ft ceiling which would lead to increased logitudinal separation for the approach and very conservative taxi & runway hold procedures (CAT II status) – all causing massive delay, holdings and diversions as a result.
On the other hand, if you don’t know the VV (vertical visibility) you would not request a CAT II approach with a RVR of 1200m or better.
I don’t know whether this is the true reason in France – but it would be a side effect. Nevertheless I personally vote for all the information available being given to the pilot for decision making.
Cobalt wrote:
VV/// typically means too low to measure, and hence below 100ft. I would definitely interpret it that way, and forget about an approach even if RVR is looking ok.
In France, it seems that VV/// just means “sky not visible, vertical visibility not measured”. The first part is in the guide from Météo France (PDF, page 10), and the second part is always the case in France as I was told.
I also found the latter information confirmed in this guide from 1998:
Translation: “In France, this group is coded VV/// since we do not code the group NsNsNshshshs due to an invisible sky.”
One doesn’t have to like that approach (I don’t), but one should know about it.
Edit: Found one more reference which states:
En France, la visibilité verticale n’est pas prévue et le groupe VVhshshs n’est utilisé que dans les situations prévues de brouillard avec des nuages invisibles, il est alors codé VV///.
Translation: In France, vertical visibility is not provided and the group VVhshshs is only used in situations of forecast fog with invisible cloud, it is thus coded VV///.
The BEA have published the Report recently.
Frankly, the report and particularly the trajectory leaves me speechless. But it is a fine example of investigative work.
BEA plot of the trajectory.
During this, the aircraft was in danger of colliding with the traffic on the motorway as well as the waiting planes on the taxiway, a Fedex 757 as well as the BA A320. It overflew the airliners twice in fact. All those on the ground very VERY lucky that day.
The PIC of this airplane was also the owner (he also owned a C210). He had a lot of experience, a grand total of 3250 hrs of which 1228 IFR and 1293 on MEP airplanes. He also had flying experience in the US and South Africa and held all necessary licenses. He also had roughly 120 hours night flying time with 108 landings at night (there is no indication how many of those were IFR).
The BEA concludes that the PIC caught sight of the motorway, which at this time of the day had a lot of traffic, and mistook it for the approach lights, which he apparently could not yet see. He subsequently aligned with that motorway and only noticed his mistake at 30 ft AGL. During the subsequent go around, he lost control of the airplane most possibly due to spatial disorientation.
They further state:
This accident illustrates the importance of making sure that the information from the
aeroplane instruments is consistent with the information based on the external visual
references, in particular in IMC and during an ILS approach for which the guidance
instruments are precise. This monitoring can be difficult in the transition phase
between the instrument approach and the visual approach when the conditions are
marginal.
JasonC wrote:
Most pilots dont ever practice a go around other than in initial training.
It’s a requirement in the IR Reval (and, I think, in biennial), no?
I think the trail of pilots getting confused by road objects is a very long one. It was one of the hypotheses in the 1970s Graham Hill crash (I read some books on it) although obviously that was in pre-GPS days when pilots had little idea of where exactly they were, until established on the ILS.
Although a requirement of the EASA IR includes a go around I don’t think this is required for the FAA IR if you maintain the required currency since there is no revalidation required. The biennial FAA flight that I do is VFR.
What we don’t do on the EASA IR revalidation is a night IFR approach. It can be quite disorienting when there are lights around the airfield. Personally I fly very few night IFR approaches mainly because the airfield I am based at is VFR and so when returning at night it would never be in the conditions of the accident aircraft. I can fully understand how you could mistake the motorway for the runway but it doesn’t explain why a standard missed approach wasn’t followed. Go arounds in training or on a revalidation are easy because you know it is coming. The only thing that I actually concentrate on, and have done this recently on my MEIR and MEP revalidations, is getting the assymetric element right and going through the full checklist. This accident highlights how it can go wrong when in a real go around situation.
I have always wondered why if you have an EASA IR you automatically have night privileges and don’t need to do the compulsory night landings that a VFR pilot must do every year to remain current.
This accident is a real lesson to carefully look at what you see when you reach the decision height on an ILS (or whatever IAP). At night especially one would normally fly an ILS on the autopilot, all the way down to the DH, and hopefully the scene should be “clean” by then…
I have always wondered why if you have an EASA IR you automatically have night privileges and don’t need to do the compulsory night landings that a VFR pilot must do every year to remain current.
I recall reading somewhere that it was a last-minute fix for the airline business when JAR-FCL arrived and due to a badly drafted clause grounded practically all airline pilots 
Possibly, @tumbleweed might remember.
