But no, I agree with Jason that there is no point doing it to yourself.
Hmm.
First, I need to revisit my previous statement that it ‘removes the surprise’. Because in real life an EFATO should never be a surprise in the first place. One should be fully prepared to get an engine failure, and gradually ‘relax’ into the flight.
Of course the fact that self-practising takes away the surprise which engine fails stands. And that’s an important thing, as it can be quite disorienting. So maybe what could be a good training scenario is to take a (pilot) friend who decides which engine to fail. Like what should happen on the check ride anyway.
Apart from the above, I still think the self-practising has some merit. It creates muscle memory. There is quite some coordinated control needed. Rudder to keep flying straight, aileron into the working engine to minimize drag, and elevator to get to that all-important best rate of climb speed. Once the correct rudder and aileron forces are in, it becomes interesting to apply the correct elevator force to get to an acceptable rate of change in forward speed upto that ROC speed.
Of course simulators are great, if they have realistic force feedback to the controls, like the ones mentioned by Jason and Timothy.
I also agree that EFATO is over trained. I like to give students an engine failure after the FAF in a 2D approach to minima. That sorts the men from the boys!
Also, speaking as real engine failure king, not a single one of the ones I have had has been the tiniest bit like the ones I have experienced in training. Several of them have been surging, with the nose swinging all over the horizon, one has not resulted in an obvious loss of power, but vibrations so bad I was concerned that the engine would detach, two others the only symptom has been masses of oil over the cowling, another the engine worked at high power but cut out at lower power, one was a loud bang and a slight rise in EGT and so the list goes on.
Apart from the generality of approach (ie TDODAR and a general understanding of how aeroplanes work) the specific training I have received has not been useful. So, again, I cannot see that repetitive practice is that helpful.
I’ve had one failure and two intentional shut downs. The shut downs were on Chieftains due to oil pressure/temp issues and completely benign. The failure was on a DA42 where we had an ECU ‘event’, followed the ECU A/B select/reset protocol during which the engine decided to shut itself down, rapidly, without feathering.
Personally, I don’t think the EFATO is over-trained. In most twins this is about the only time you have to do something relatively quickly. Failures in the cruise/descent/approach are almost a non-event, once you’ve recognised the failure.
There’s an interesting discussion about simulating an engine failure on approach and flying to ‘minima’; many feel that minima should be adjusted to reflect ACA(H) which, if you slavishly follow DA42 AFM guidance, jumps up to about 800ft. I don’t really have a view on the whole failure-on-approach scenario other than it is less likely that an engine will fail, unannounced, when you’re only demanding about 50% power.
Failures in the cruise/descent/approach are almost a non-event, once you’ve recognised the failure.
One insidious scenario is the failure to carry out a precautionary shutdown in the cruise. The affected engine then seizes, unfeathered, and in the case of most piston twins if close to max all up mass, the aircraft is probably heading towards the scene of the accident.
The example I am thinking of was in a BE58, no slouch in the SE performance department, but if at gross, the SE climb performance is still a paltry 200-300 fpm, at ISA sea level.
Most MEP training is carried out half tanks, with either two or three on board, giving a somewhat optimistic idea of SE performance, and possibly masking poor technique.
There is insufficient training on the need to take action if an engine is displaying a worrying trend.
A classic MCC (multi crew co ordination) scenario is having a failure in the cruise at FL390. Only a minority of freshly minted fATPLs recognise that if you try and maintain FL390 OEI you will end up in a loss of control scenario. Despite probably having aced the question bank on Performance and Principles of Flight, and holding an MEP.
RobertL18C wrote:
The example I am thinking of was in a BE58
Was that in France? In that case, the pilots decided to continue towards their destination despite having alternatives which they could have reached with one engine turning and one unfeathered, instead of crashing.
No in South America, but interesting that there may have been a similar occurrence closer to home.
Agreed with @Dave_Phillips , but when it does happen, it can be a very insidious failure. An approach failure on one engine and a late go-around normally goes undetected and can get exciting very fast if you’re close to the ground. It was probably a contributing factor to the president of our Twin Commander Flight Group’s crash three years ago when he crashed his 680E. He survived, but will probably never fly again. There was a 310 that crashed on approach in the UK a few years back, as I recall, with an experienced pilot, where that might have been a contributing factor. He was low on fuel, had to go around at the last minute and one fuel starved on him. Inverted and crashed.
I myself landed my 520 at a lot of high elevation airports in the Rockies, and my left engine had a tendency to quit at idle at high altitudes. First time I noticed it was in Utah as I was turning off to taxiway – left had quit (with the old pressure carbs that auto-leaned, the engines mixture kind of lived there own lives). It was a bitch to get started again. Then that kind of happened at every high elevation airport from then on. A late go around in one of those scenarios, could be disastrous. Therefore I always kept a little power in until I knew I had landing made, just in case. Which is good practice with geared engines anyway.
Mine for real was a purging of all the water, dramatic over heating, but fortunately it did not seize, which I guess could have been the next element in the saga. As others have said you are never entirely prepared for the exact circumstances, and when it happens, it isnt always a matter of “instantly” shutting it down.
From here
AdamFrisch wrote:
Twin engine skills don’t diminish twice as fast as flying skills in general.
Not even EFATO skills?
Perhaps they do, but even so, but let’s take a hypothetical example of an engine failure for someone who hasn’t had recurrent training for 2 years or more:
1. Single engine EFATO.
2. Twin engine EFATO.
Where would you rather be from a purely statistical outlook?
