EASA is different it seems:
AUR.ACAS.1005 Performance requirement
The following turbine-powered aeroplanes shall be equipped with collision avoidance logic version 7.1 of ACAS II:
aeroplanes with a maximum certificated take-off mass exceeding 5 700 kg; or
aeroplanes authorised to carry more than 19 passengers
Vref wrote:
That’s an interesting remark….How will we know if it there was a traffic advisory in the Cirrus? What about the TCAS in the metro…or its not mandatory for this kind of OPS?
The aircraft survived largely intact and the occupants were unharmed. The G1000 perspective system will have this information logged. TCAS is not required in the Metro, but it may very well have been equipped with either TCAS or a TAS system.
Peter wrote:
This video is interesting
The person in the video reviewing the accident says he thinks the tail was broken in the impact. I don’t think this is the case as the video of the parachute shows the airplane to be intact and the aircraft is tail low just before impact with the ground. My guess is that the Cirrus hit the Metroliner along the top with the landing gear which I don’t see on the parachute video. Also, both wings seem to have not been damaged on the pictures or video. Had the two aircraft come in contact with the tail section of the Cirrus, there would be a lot more damage, the tail would have separated and the cabin would have had to penetrate the Metroliner first.
RobertL18C wrote:
Again a datapoint that needs verifying, but the Cirrus was flying around 50 knots above nominated speeds and much faster than the Metroliner. Another reason for the overshoot, if you turn base at 165KIAS this might happen.
165KIAS with a density altitude of 6500 feet means around 188KTAS???? Sorry, I have to ask where does this 165 KIAS come from? Looking at Flight Radar, I see it’s last reports before impact as being 144Kts – which would be the ground speed, as the speed transmitted by ADSB is this, not KIAS or KTAS, but Ground Speed.
I’m wondering if the pilot was new to the airport? Yes, he took off from there but if it was his first experience flying from this base, took off from, say, 17L, came back, was expecting to see two parallel runways and lined up with the right hand piece of two visible runways. Now look on Google Earth / Google Maps at the layout. The tarmac to the right of 17L – when viewing the airport North up, i.e. it’s taxiway – is wider than the runway itself.
Maybe he forgot – or didn’t know – that 17R is smaller, narrower, shorter and the runway threshold was displaced further south and from that distance out, he lined up with the right hand piece of 2 bits of real estate covered in Tarmac, believing this was 17L and that the Metro would be lined up on the second piece of tarmac.
As for traffic reporting, in the circuit I know a lot of pilots who switch off the warnings to allow them to focus on the job in hand, maybe he did the same….
PS: Someone said it was an SR22T – it wasn’t; it was an SR22 G5 GTS….
https://kdvr.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/11/2021/05/Report_CEN21FA215_103073_5_24_2021-3_19_37-PM.pdf
Report_CEN21FA215_103073_5_24_2021_3_19_37_PM_pdf
Preliminary NTSB just giving factual information.
Presumably the successful Cirrus training programme has very clear nominated speeds for the traffic pattern, recall other aircraft in the pattern were training types (C172).
In an SOP environment the tolerances are typically either +5 or 10, and – 0 or -5.
