What I remember is that I could never quite get it perfectly trimmed, as in, you take your hands off the stick and you fly level. It always needed a bit of stick force. Maybe in my 182 I got used to being perfectly in trim, because in a 182 you have to. But I haven’t flown a Cirrus in nearly 20 years.
If anything a faster than desirable trim is good in a situation like this. Given that the pilot was new on type, “autopilot rot” is unlikely to be a massive factor there.
Simply put, the SR22 (as other 300hp+ singles such as the Bonanza A36 or Piper Saratoga) is a handful when going around with full flaps. You need to push quite hard to prevent the nose from going right up too high. This is not trained as nearly as often as a touch and go where flaps are retracted on the ground.
So probably a sad case of not being familiar / trained enough in this manoeuvre, with a stall at too low an altitude to do anything about it. But mot a very type specific accident.
Getting off topic but yes probably no FTO will do the TBM CR unless you have an IR, though this is not a “not allowed” legal requirement.
If the NAA enforces the GM (which is contradictory since “guidance” is just that and not law) then it’s not up to the ATO to decide.
So probably a sad case of not being familiar / trained enough in this manoeuvre, with a stall at too low an altitude to do anything about it. But mot a very type specific accident.
Looks like it, especially since the plane was so new. Is it known where the pilot did his PPL and Cirrus training?
I am critical of pilots, particularly new to the type, who do not practice stalls and forced approaches regularly. When I have type trained pilots on new types, it has generally been a few hours of stalls in all configurations, and dozens of practice forced approaches to touchdown. During this training, I have assessed the pilot’s instinctive reaction to approach to stall. Thereafter, I have instructed that practicing more at regular interval is important. I don’t care if it’s an expensive by the hour cross country plane, it’ll still stall, and the pilot should practice to gain, and then maintain instinct it recovery.
I am unsympathetic toward pilots who seem to rely on gadgets in light GA airplanes. Certified airplanes have demonstrated that they can be flown, stalled and recovered safely without the use of such gadgets. In my opinion, during abnormal flight close to the ground, or unusual attitude recovery, the primary instrument reference should be the ball, otherwise eyes out. Even airspeed and engine power setting should be by ear during critical seconds of recovery.
As for the use of rudder, in my airplane (180HP), it is entirely normal to use lots of rudder during takeoff, and use full rudder, to the stops in both directions several tines during the landing rollout. If, at any time while you’re flying, regardless of “systems” in the plane, the ball is more than half out unintended, the pilot was not paying attention enough to the basics.
New pilots are very welcomed in our industry. New pilots need to remind themselves that they are new, seek out competent training on type, and thereafter practice until instinct always kicks in when needed. That monthly hour of practice stalls and forced approaches is an investment in your life! Miss the $250 hamburger once a month, and head to the practice area instead! As it has been winter (and my plane has no cabin heat), I have only flown a couple of hours since November. But in those were two practice forced approaches, and a number of wings level and banked stalls to the break – just for practice!
I just want to add a small counterpoint to all the message saying we need to practice and we should know how to recover from any situation.
I personally always wonder, how much of the startle effect could delay an otherwise reasonably competent pilot to identify and recover. When close to the ground it can be very quickly fatal.
All my stalls, unusual, emergency recovery are in dedicated training flight. I expect them. I likely have done some review on ground before to make sure I am ready.
What happens when you don’t expect it? I think anyone can have a bad day, get confused, and make a mistake. It certainly happens to me regularly to make mistake. it’s just that they were never anywhere close to a dangerous situation.
As far as the Cirrus Training, I have gone through it, and all the emphasis is about stabilised approach and recognising sign when it’s not and go around early, I think it’s pretty good.
Beside regular practice, I strongly believe an advantage of plane with advanced avionics is its ability to feed all the data back for analysis, specifically get landing/approach score from flysto, so when you don’t practice you catch mistakes and correct them before they get too bad. It’s almost like getting an instructor debrief after every flight.
It’s very possible for anyone with the best training to just make the wrong mistake at the wrong time and not react quickly enough.
I think the startle effect is possibly quite significant: we don’t really practise power on stalls the way they happen in real life (well, because we can’t) and it usually ends up with us hanging off the prop wondering how anyone could ever possibly get into this state accidentally.
The pilot may have been task saturated (new on type, things not going all that well but no so badly he felt he should stop) dealing with the bounce, and when he made the perfectly rational decision to go around put the power in. The aircraft trimmed for landing would have immediately reared up to an unexpectedly high nose attitude, barely at flying speed, and would have needed what to the pilot would be a highly unusual amount of force (and a startlingly high force) on the stick, and being somewhat task saturated wasn’t anticipating this nor immediately understood that it was just because the aircraft was very out of trim and the solution was simply to push very hard. With very little time to prevent the stall, that was all she wrote. I think this has played itself out many times in many different aircraft types (there’s a video of something similar happening with a Cessna 150 on go around, which doesn’t have all that high control forces even when very out of trim).
I don’t know what the stick forces are like in the Cirrus when this far out of trim – but a possible factor is with the side stick in what is most people’s weakest arm could also compound this (at least in a 182 or a PA-28, you can just grab the yoke with both hands and push).
It makes you wonder why the massive nose up trim change with power hasn’t been engineered out aerodynamically. That would be a better solution than control system patches.
alioth wrote:
I think the startle effect is possibly quite significant: we don’t really practise power on stalls the way they happen in real life (well, because we can’t) and it usually ends up with us hanging off the prop wondering how anyone could ever possibly get into this state accidentally.
A part of the practicing would be to reduce startle effect. It won’t be so startling if it’s practiced. Practicing full power stall is certainly possible, and should be done. Caution for overheating air cooled engines, but otherwise, at altitude – practice! Prevent unintended spin entry with correct use of rudder.
If you’re “ahead” of the plane while flying, surprise and startle will be at a minimum. If you are startled, fly in the middle of the sky (not as high, nor low as you could be). Reduce AoA, and pause to evaluate before you do the next thing. If the ground is coming up, add power.
This whole discussion is why I oppose the notion that the application of power is an element of recovery from a stall. Reducing AoA, and allowing the airplane to regain flying speed is stall recovery. The application of power is to reduce altitude loss, which, though important, is secondary to maintaining controlled flight. If you can’t prevent hitting the ground, at least do it under control! To do that, don’t lose control of the plane, or, recovery it if you have lost control.
As for control forces, the Cirrus would have demonstrated that a maximum of 60 pounds pitch control force for momentary application would be required in any circumstance (meaning from the most adverse trim setting to the opposite phase of flight, while the airplane is retrimmed). The Cirrus, like any certified plane, will have demonstrated this without requiring unusual pilot skill attention, nor strength. Though I have not flown a Cirrus (I should really take my buddy up on his offer), if it requires larger pitch control force application in an unusual event, that should be practiced! Then the pilot knows what to expect.
An SR22 woth 1 POB that‘s trimmed for an 80-knot normal final approach has a trim setting which is of course somewhat aft of neutral. Therefore, in a last-second go around, some immediate push of the stick is required. But is nothing out of the ordinary. Much less force than in a C182. The trim indication is right there in front of you.
I read the thread on Flyer in go-arounds and get quivers when I see how many pilots put achieving „pitch up“ as an immediate priority on a go-around. No wonder we get those accidents regularly.
