"Own Navigation" versus "direct"

bookworm wrote:

The accident was caused by the crew on HAZE 01 not noticing the shortcomings in the clearances issued by the air traffic controllers and to the risks of following these clearances, which resulted in the aircraft coming to leave controlled airspace and be flown at an altitude that was lower than the surrounding terrain.

This sentence sounds as if Sir Humprey wrote it.

bookworm wrote:

I find the way the conclusion is worded quite bizarre:

I agree that the wording is bizarre.

The descent clearances were technically incorrect as a flight that is planned in controlled airspace can’t be cleared into uncontrolled airspace without explicit request by the aircrew. On the other hand the route was not changed so the responsibility for terrain clearance in any case rested with the crew.

IIRC the plane was a RNAF C130 and the accident happens on the Swedish side of the border during a joint exercise. So the Norwegian AAIB was involved as well as the Swedes.

Is military ATC the same as civilian? I recall a military trial of an RAF controller based at Leuchers, EGQL, who had approved the descent of 2 US fighters to an altitude at which they flew into the Cairngorm mountains.
I think he was found not guilty.
Some military traffic flies regularly IMC in the hills, so the controller may not know how the “military callsign” is equipped/qualified.

Is military ATC the same as civilian? I recall a military trial of an RAF controller based at Leuchers, EGQL, who had approved the descent of 2 US fighters to an altitude at which they flew into the Cairngorm mountains.

Much of the service provided to UK airspace users outside controlled airspace is provided by military controllers. At the time, the service that the F-15s were receiving was a Radar Information Service, which left the responsibility for terrain avoidance entirely with the pilots. When the F-15s requested descent and the controller instructed a descent to 4000 ft. This level put them into Ben McDui. The instruction was presumably considered sufficiently unwise that the controller was court-martialled, and subsequently acquitted.

One consequence of the accident was the cleaning up of the responsibilities for terrain avoidance. In the newer “Traffic Service” described in CAP 774:

Terrain
3.7 Subject to ATS surveillance system coverage, Traffic Service may be provided
below ATC unit terrain safe levels; however, pilots remain responsible for terrain
clearance at all times. Other than when following a notified instrument flight
procedure, a pilot intending to descend below the ATC unit terrain safe level
shall be reminded that he remains responsible for terrain clearance.

Levels
3.11 Pilots may select their own operating levels or may be provided with level
allocations by the controller for the positioning and/or sequencing of traffic or for
navigational assistance. … Levels allocated by controllers shall be
terrain safe in accordance with the ATC unit terrain safe levels, unless an
agreement is reached with the pilot, or such levels form part of VFR clearances
for aerodrome arrival or to enter controlled airspace that by necessity require flight
below the unit terrain safe levels; in such circumstances, the instruction shall be
accompanied by a reminder that the pilot remains responsible for terrain
clearance.

So these days, under a Traffic Service, an instruction to descend to 4000 ft in those circumstances would be clearly incorrect.

Had this level of clarity of responsibility existed at Kiruna, it is unlikely that the accident would have occurred.

From an ATC point of view – great that the rules are clear, and that they get adapted as we learn from accidents. The rule is “don’t direct aircraft into terrain”, and where it isn’t yet, it should be.

From a pilot’s point of view, i don’t think the rules are really relevant. “He was flying according to the rules” is a bad epitaph :-)

While bookworm, helpful and knowledgeable as always (and there is no irony here – I mean that, THANKS!) pointed out earlier where separation obligations sit between controller ans pilots, I think that as pilot the ultimate responsibility to not crash is mine, and it is very much “trust, but verify”, regardless of what the rules say. And especially these days, with GPS maps and EGPWS / EGPWS like apps, terrain avoidance is easier than ever. I wish traffic avoidance were the same.

My IMC rating instructor drilled into me that I am flying IFR, and ATC may be there to help, but that I am on my own. He taught that when getting vectored for final, I should check the minimum altitudes and re-brief the approach accordingly, e.g., “Vectors to final, minimum 2,300ft until established on the localizer, then 1,800ft”

My IR instructor thought that this was just earning “examiner brownie points”. Far from that.

Maoraigh wrote:

Is military ATC the same as civilian?

In Sweden, there is no military ATC. All ATC is civilian since the 1970’s.

Cobalt wrote:

“Vectors to final, minimum 2,300ft until established on the localizer, then 1,800ft”

I’m with you in theory, Cobalt, but how does it work in practice? How do you decide your minimum altitude?

If ATC instructs descent to 2,000 ft on a vector before intercept, what do you do? Refuse? Ask for confirmation and then accept?

…isn’t there a MVA chart? Sometimes you might get a descent under vectors to 1,500 feet at Southend, which means intercepting around 5 DME, but this would be in VMC and they would request permission from you as PIC.

If you do IR training in mountainous terrain, briefing the MVA chart is drilled into you.