Actually there has never been a case of spinal injury. The plane comes down in a slight nose down attitude with about 17 mph, and from the 3 pilots I talked to who exerienced it they all said that it was a pretty smooth landing.
Last week i purchased the complete interior of a G3 that landed by CAPS two years ago. It is like new and the airbags in the seatbelts did not deploy and not eventhe “anti-g” elements in the seats are damaged.
PS: If I was 5000 feet above an airport and had an engine failure – i would land, of course, becasue I know i can do it. If I had engine failure somewhere else I would use CAPS. That’s the recommended method – for good reason.
The problem with posting a list with stuff like “autopilot induced stall” in it is that there is bound to be somebody who knows how an autopilot works and who is going to find time to say something about it. I will say very little especially as being an admin/mod leaves me open to certain accusations, and we have already had someone complain about a photo of the one where the chute didn’t open. But, hey, I fly a plane myself (well sort of) so I can’t resist commenting… Let’s have a very quick look at the list:
CAPS event #1, 1 uninjured, VFR departure after maintenance, aileron unhinged due maintenance error
Was there loss of control? Normally the loss of one aileron would not do that. I have read about that one many times but it was never clear that the plane was actually not controllable.
CAPS event #2, April 2004, Lethbridge, AB, Canada (CAPS Save #2)
4 uninjured; Factors: VFR night cruise, loss of control, autopilot-induced stall, night VFR over mountains,
“autopilot-induced stall” = pilot asleep
CAPS event #3, April 2004, Fort Lauderdale, FL (CAPS Save #3)
1 uninjured; Factors: confusing instrument behavior, low IMC, departure climb, water in static system;
Backup instruments not working?
CAPS event #4, Sept 2004, Peters, CA (CAPS Save #4)
2 uninjured; Factors: VFR climb, autopilot-induced stall, rolled inverted, attempted recovery;
“autopilot-induced stall” = pilot asleep
CAPS event #5, Feb 2005, Norden, CA (not CAPS Save, parachute separated from airframe)
1 fatality; Factors: severe icing at 16,000’ over Sierra mountains, high speed descent well above Vne of 204 knots;
Lack of preflight, lack of in-flight management
CAPS event #6, June 2005, Haverstraw, NY (CAPS Save #5)
1 serious injury; Factors: pilot incapacitated from brain seizure, loss of conciousness, awoke and recovered from Vne dive, determined numbness and loss of function in legs;
A good use of the chute.
CAPS event #, Jan 2006, Childersburg, AL (CAPS Save #6)
3 uninjured; Factors: severe icing at 9,000 feet, loss of control;
Lack of preflight, lack of in-flight management
CAPS event #8, Feb 2006, Wagner, SD (CAPS Save #7)
2 uninjured; Factors: pilot disorientation in clouds, shortly after takeoff;
Did he have an IR, and of so, why get disorientated in IMC? If no IR, then it’s a lack of preflight and a lack of in-flight management.
CAPS event #9, Aug 2006, Indianapolis, IN (CAPS Save #8, parachute observed not fully deployed)
1 fatality, 3 serious injuries; Factors: IMC, loss of control, stall/spin descent; Activation: low altitude; 528 feet AGL in 100 knot spin (3-1/2 turns) just 4 seconds prior to impact,
Did he have an IR, and of so, why get disorientated in IMC? If no IR, then it’s a lack of preflight and a lack of in-flight management.
CAPS event #10, Sept 2006, Bull Bay, Jamaica (CAPS Save #9)
4 uninjured; Factors: loss of control, VFR cruise, passenger activated when fuel streaming from tank filler openings;
How does fuel streaming out of the fillers cause a loss of control? Could he not fly to an airport, land it, refill as required, close the filler caps, and fly on?
CAPS activation #11, Feb 2007, Sydney, Australia (not CAPS Save; parachute not extracted due to anomalous rocket trajectory)
2 injuries; Factors: VFR cruise, engine problems, rocket took unusual trajectory, , successful emergency off-airport landing; Activation: low altitude; Weather: VMC; Landing: trees
Was there a total loss of engine power? IMHO if there was, they would not have said “engine problems”. Also “rocket took unusual trajectory” sounds a bit suspect. Who wrote those descriptions? The NTSB? Or COPA?
CAPS event #12, Apr 2007, Luna, NM (CAPS Save #10)
1 injured; Factors: IMC cruise, climb to avoid weather, loss of airspeed indication, terrain warning in IMC; Activation: low altitude, inverted, 34 knots airspeed; Weather: IMC, icing;
Did he have an IR, and of so, why get disorientated in IMC? Was pitot heat not on? If no IR, then it’s a lack of preflight and a lack of in-flight management.
CAPS event #13, Aug 2007, Nantucket, MA (CAPS Save #11)
2 injured; Factors: VFR in IMC during approach, parachute tangled with tower wires, 1 serious injury, 1 minor injury, 1 unborn child saved; Activation: low altitude; Weather: IMC;
Hmmm. Did he have an IR?
CAPS event #13, Oct 2008, Spain (CAPS Save #12)
uninjured; Factors: IFR in IMC during approach, pilot reported turbulence and loss of control, parachute tangled with power line wires; Activation: low altitude; Weather: IMC;
Hmmm. What did he fly into?
CAPS event #15, Nov 2008, Turriaco, Italy (CAPS Save #13 )
1 seriously injured, 3 uninjured; Factors: fuel exhaustion and loss of engine power, parachute deployed at low altitude and late in the power-off glide scenario, approximately 400 feet above ground; Activation: low altitude; Weather: VMC; Landing: trees and grass
Lack of preflight, lack of in-flight management.
That’s not the point, Peter,
We all know that most accidents happen because most of stupid mistakes. But that’s true for all types. And in the Cirrus you have a chance to survive them. You can just aswell make a list of all fatal TB20 accidents … think it would be much different?
You could now argue that none of the above would happen to TB20 (Columbia? :-)) pilots. But i doubt it, and I am not for the death penalty, even if he pilots were stupid.
Flying a Cirrus you almost certainly will fly the same or similiar missions that you would in a twin; in other words you will probably be happy to fly at night, over an low undercast or fog, over mountains, more prolonged trips over the sea. (I know some might not). So inevitably you place yourself in greater harms way in the first place, so everything being equal without the chute you would expect the serious accident death rate to be higher. The starting point is you are therefore not comparing like with like and that is one reason why the death / serious injury rate of the SEP fleet as a whole would be skewed.
For the same reason there is another skew at work; undubtedly there are some Cirrus owners who are tempted to make flights that they probably shouldnt, even in a Cirrus or a twin.
To make a proper comparison both factors would need to be taken into account – there are undoubtedly others at work.
It is a very similiar argument to the often heard – the risk of flying a twin is greater. Well part of the explanation is twin missions potentially place the pilot at greater risk in the first place because for example you might fly an approach to minima at night in IMC in a twin whereas the majority of SEP pilots would not.
Also: Autopilots of the pre DFC90 and GFC700 era can easily fly you into a stall in certain conditions. It has not only happened in GA airplanes but in bigger ones aswell.
While it is true that it can be avoided if the pilot always pays attention – it looks like (Cirrus?) pilots do NOT always pay attention, and so it can happen. Now a stall in IMC with a subsequent loss of control is not every pilot can handle.
That’s actually one of the biggest advantages of the new autopilots, they will not stall the airplane.
(PS, again …: The one chute that “did not open”, was clearly a case of mistake by the service center)
How about this one:
https://aviation-safety.net/wikibase/wiki.php?id=19055
or this one
https://aviation-safety.net/wikibase/wiki.php?id=180033
that’s a comparable one too
https://aviation-safety.net/wikibase/wiki.php?id=19054
(Did he have an IR, and of so, why get disorientated in IMC? If no IR, then it’s a lack of preflight and a lack of in-flight management ?)
There’s a list of 79 TB20 crashes on the ASN. If you have a look at some of them you will see that some of the pilots were just as stupid.
Listing TB20 or (whatever other type) crashes (yes, many) does not undermine the argument of the value of a chute.
Of course it does – because it shows that comparable accidents were survivable in the Cirrus. They happen in all types, and many of them were survved in the Cirrus.
Why is that so hard to accept?
Why did you buy the cirrus cockpit. Are you going to build a SIM?
No, i am not THAT crazy :-)
I only bought the 4 seats!
I had already modified the panel’s avionics bezel to the G3 standard and i also installed new door panels last year – and now i will install the “new” seats, which will modify the cabin to G3 standard.
I am pretty sure i can sell my black leather seats to somebody who wants to upgrade his 20 or 22 to leather seats …
