boscomantico wrote:
Yes, something went wrong with his descent/approach computations. Actually, that is quite obvious… hence I didn’t even point this out again.
Peter wrote:
But, wasn’t this a zero-zero approach?
boscomantico wrote:
Other than that, only some driwel about CRM in the report.
I wouldn’t call that drivel. There are two pilots on board – both paid by the aircraft owner to do their job. I pilot 1 does not allow pilot 2 to do his part, then there is effectively only one pilot on board and his totally stupid and criminal behavior goes unnoticed and unchallenged. What I can’t understand in this accident is that the second pilot let this happen. He was 40 years old, a “grown up” person so to say. With some flying experience of his own. Unfortunately, other than the recent crash at Saarbrücken, this accident cost the life of two innocent people. Otherwise I would just say: One gets what one asks for.
what_next wrote:
There are two pilots on board – both paid by the aircraft owner to do their job. I pilot 1 does not allow pilot 2 to do his part, then there is effectively only one pilot on board and his totally stupid and criminal behavior goes unnoticed and unchallenged.
I completely agree that a working two pilot cockpit with good CRM is unvalueable compared to single pilot operations, but I guess you as a professional pilot know it at best, that placing two pilots into one cockpit doesn’t make CRM happen. It is training, understanding and character of the persons involved.
what_next wrote:
What I can’t understand in this accident is that the second pilot let this happen. He was 40 years old, a “grown up” person so to say. With some flying experience of his own.
Well it is possible that these approaches where happening before, with better result. Hence nobody has seen a need to object, because everybody has seen this approach going well before. It is a human issue to bias perceived risk, a good start is https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Risk_perception#Heuristics_and_biases
TobiBS wrote:
Well it is possible that these approaches where happening before…
I would say, that I am convinced that these approaches were happening before. 100m visibility in fog at a VFR only airfield is not something an experienced pilot would try at the first attempt. I am also convinced that the second pilot took part in such approaches before. Obviously he was about to speak out (which is why that first pilot expressed the wish to get rid of him after this flight), but still didn’t say NO!.
I have been in this business for quite some time myself. I have seen enough pilots like the no.1 pilot in this accident. I have even agreed to bust one or another rule. I myself have flown VFR to Trier in less than VFR weather. But 100 or 200m visilbility? In an aeroplane that crosses the threshold at more than 100kt? Never would I have agreed to that. With the owner in the back, all that needed to be done was turn around and tell him that we have to divert. Then even the boldest cowboy in the left hand seat can do nothing else.
I get your point, but as boscomantico said:
Interestingly, the aircraft never made any radio call(s) to Trier Info before crashing.
But 100 or 200m visilbility?
TobiBS wrote:
A worst case scenario could be an inflight download of a webcam picture which was fed from a cache or not current.
I would say that’s technically almost impossible. They had been at FL140 and above until shortly before their final apprach. There is no good enough reception of mobile networks from a jet at those levels to download pictures. My guess would be that the co-pilot, whose duty it would have been to make the radio calls, did not really believe they would try an approach into Trier and therefore did not call them. Even the passengers had informed their relatives before departure that they would fly to Hahn instead of Trier. I think those two guys up front did hardly talk to each other during that flight (the co-pilot probably knowing that the captain wanted to dump him ASAP) and that superhero skygod in the left hand seat wanted to show the other guys how good a “true professional” can handle a difficult approach. All on his own.
And the whole discussion about VNAV calculation is irrelevant. It was a suicidal approach attempt.
TobiBS wrote:
A worst case scenario could be an inflight download of a webcam picture which was fed from a cache or not current.
Landing a jet at a VFR field in fog based on a webcam download? Are you serious?
JasonC wrote:
And the whole discussion about VNAV calculation is irrelevant. It was a suicidal approach attempt.
Exactly. At 100m visibility and over 100kt, you will have about a second to align your aircraft with the centreline (if you are even close to it) and flare. Few pilots could do that, the last of them died last week… (and I guess he would not have been able once past age 70 or so).
NB: Idiots like him and the guy who crashed this week in Saarbrücken are the cause of the “cowboy” reputation that corporate (and private) pilots generally have with the public and the airlines.
what_next wrote:
I would say that’s technically almost impossible. They had been at FL140 and above until shortly before their final apprach. There is no good enough reception of mobile networks from a jet at those levels to download pictures.
JasonC wrote:
Landing a jet at a VFR field in fog based on a webcam download? Are you serious?
It seems you completely misunderstood the idea behind my post. Again, I am not arguing for the crew, neither the PIC, nor the copilot. The webcam picture was one thinking experiment of what can bring people to believe something. My point is, that we still don’t know, what information led to the decision. Or what the general idea behind the “procedure” was. I completely agree with you, that if you know there is 100m fog on a VFR only field, an approach is not what one should try.
But again, as there was no radio contact to Trier, neither a question to ATC about the weather, the only fact we have from the report is that the PIC called Trier before departure and received the information that a landing will not be possible due to fog. So how did the decision making (if there was some) happen? This is the interesting point in my view.
It could be like what_next says, that, correct me if I am citing you wrong, the PIC commenced the approach and he ignored the weather at all. If that was the case, do you think he followed a procedure like on a non-precision approach? With a self set minimum? E.g. 500ft AGL, because this felt good in VMC? Or do you think the cowboyness led him to the belief he could fly a CATIII approach, because he can?
what_next wrote:
and that superhero skygod in the left hand seat wanted to show the other guys how good a “true professional” can handle a difficult approach. All on his own.
But why did even the PIC tell his wife that they will probably divert to Hahn before the flight? Was it maybe because they always tried to approach Trier, at least once with some kind of DIY approach before a diversion? It would be interesting in my oppinion to see radar data of the other diversions. Maybe it was standard procedure (not only for this PIC) to do it like that.
