Yes, I just read the report and I feel kind of intimate with the situation as @Dan sais.
a) OToneH it is very easy to pick on the two obvious flying mistakes: the wrong altitude on the turn to final and the adjustment of glidepath with pitch without adding power.
b) OTOH it is clear from the pilot and copilot accounts that CRM played a big role.
I am missing remarks on survivability of the accident (per ICAO Annex 13 guidance) . A pity that use of seatbelt (or lack thereof) by the deceased might have been a factor that we cannot verify in the formal absence of such data.
Like @Dan, I have flown with many pilots , most more experienced than myself, and I have had no conflicting situations like this. Normally flight ops are not as tricky as altiport flying and do not warrant such detailed briefing.
In the case of @Dan, I knew he was much more experienced than myself both in general and flying in the mountains. Clearly a similar scenario as depicted in the OP. However, there was never a doubt that I was PIC. I was also the one with the current rating and the type and site knowledge. Some specific roles were split, key items were briefed. Now I sin of speaking out loud most of the stuff I do in flight when there is another pilot, so that probably facilitates matters and helps the other guy sit easier with what is going on.
Reading this report we should have probably briefed even more for our flight, and I will definitely make a further point of it going forwards.
Let myself not be fooled by the simplistic reading of only part a)
Last, I disagree on the outcome of the recommendation with the amended Decree. It is evident from the report and this thread that it is very difficult to make ends meet so one can get formal training for mountain ratings in France. THis is one of the factors that hurts the quality of the training. I see the new rules making ends meet for training even more difficult…
All agreed with @Antonio, no objection your honor 
It’s when I was reading this tragic accident report that the similarities of our constellation not too long ago hit me.
I sure will keep our little outing as a very good memory, thanks to your safe and professional flying 
Informal multi crew in the absence of shared SOPs for the type and mission is full of potential pitfalls. 99% of the time it probably works out, with a gentle, informal sharing of light duties for the PNF. Safety is enhanced with extra lookout and having someone to bounce off ADM what-if type scenarios. However, without shared SOPs it is not easy to ‘plan the flight and fly the plan’.
I would recommend all owner pilots to develop basic SOPs, then it is easier to share this framework with a colleague in the cockpit.
aart wrote:
consistency in briefing: “shut up and shoot videos”
You guys are too kind, and to be fair, to the above two briefing items, in the case of @Dan , we added “look out for those 203 paragliders” . IN any case it is quite relaxing and very safe to fly with either of you: different reasons, but it works.
The only argument was about my method for counting paragliders, after I explained it was about 100 on the western ridge, another 100 on the southern, then three more 12 o’clock, two high, one low. I still can’t find fault with my counting.
Seriously traffic is one more item to factor in mountain flying, where airspace is constrained by terrain, and flying tends to concentrate on weekend days of good wx, no factor in the OP, other than maybe that is why at Courchevel AFIS tend to guide traffic to base and skip reconnaisance .
The point in this more relaxed conversation, that some might find not too respectful of those involved in this accident, is that one way or another, there has to be a good enough crew connection and mutual trust to ensure it works seamlessly. A detailed preflight brief will definitely be instrumental in bridging any gaps therein.
Antonio wrote:
maybe that is why at Courchevel AFIS tend to guide traffic to base and skip reconnaisance .
I think there are two reasons. First when you fly overhead you fly over all the high price hotels etc. with associated noise. You are also forbidden traffic patterns around noon. But after all half their guests did arrive by plane or helicopter, so they should not complain ;-)
The second reason is probably indeed traffic. In winter this is not a normal mountain airfield but a busy airport with flights every few minutes. Jetfly will arrange their silver PC12 in an orderly queue waiting for passengers. 3-4 parked in a line are not unusual on a good day.
Thomas_R wrote:
No mountain pilot would ever fly directly into base for an approach to an altiport without a go around option. Always check the runway, wind conditions, etc. There are often even multiple overflights to pick up all the information. This also helps to make known that you are going to land soon.
+1
Very helpful diagram, thanks for sharing it.
Very helpful diagram, thanks for sharing it.
Very interesting but remember that this is not the procedure/circuit currently in use at Courchevel! When watching old videos one can also see that the Tyrolean Dash 8 did use an overhead procedure no longer in use, so things must have changed over the years.
The old approach put the pattern around 6725ft, and the new one is at 7000ft (at final turn, still level flight). Both are above the top of the runway (6590ft) during base / final turn, a lot higher above the threshold (6371ft).
The accident aircraft is quoted around 6600ft at final turn (about as high as the top), descending, and quickly reaching the threshold altitude.
It’s my guess that the pilot initially flew a descent by “aircraft behavior” (where you put in usual engine parameters, target 500 fpm or set a specific pitch attitude, expecting to stay on or about the right glidepath) instead of positioning the aircraft on the absolute correct glidepath (ideally ILS or PAPI, also possible to do altitude / position cross-checks). I guess we do it this way most of the time in VFR: just fly a certain fpm, and visually check if the runway has the right shape (not too high / low). By itself, I would consider this method to be too risky for such an altiport – optical illusions of runway slope / surrounding terrain make it hard to estimate the glidepath correctly (you also don’t use the same 5% glidepath relative to the runway’s angle, that would put you in a 10%+ climb for landing…).
Even then, using this usual method on regular fields, you still have to start roughly at the right spot, and above all you sometimes have to make heavy corrections (including power increase for level flight when too low, which the pilot did not do). So to me the (main) probable cause is still the failure to set the correct attitude / power parameters during a critical flight phase. All the rest is “contributing”.
One more reason to emphasize (and stay proficient in) the basics of flying.
