Dan wrote:
Pure speculation which has no place in a factual report.
Whether or not it should be in the report or not I don’t know, but pure speculation it is not. Given where the peak airspeed was reached (with the plane still not off the ground), the over rotation, and the first set of trees only being another 180m or so from that point, looking at the performance of the aircraft at the actual weight it was it’s pretty fair to say that there was a significant probability of striking the first set of trees even though the trees aren’t big.
I think the call to abort the takeoff and have a low energy gear collapse, rather than the rather high risk of a high energy collision with trees, was probably the right one.
alioth wrote:
I think the call to abort the takeoff and have a low energy gear collapse, rather than the rather high risk of a high energy collision with trees, was probably the right one.
Absolutely, no question about that very decision.
But speculations have no place in a factual accident report. Armchair pilots can do all the speculation they want. Maybe insurance companies will. An enquiry board should certainly refrain from making them.
Dan wrote:
What? No [rejected takeoff] data for an airplane used not only in private, but commercial ops?
Is that information really relevant for a performance class B airplane – SEPs in particular?
Do you have an example of a SEP POH that provides this information?
To engage in a little speculation myself:
This 31,000 hr pilot probably knows a lot of people in the UK aviation ‘system’. He’ll know folks at the CAA and the AAIB, they will likely have shared many lunches.
The report probably indulges in this speculation in an attempt to bring some credit to the commander – his decision to abort saved them from a much worse accident, etc. Best not be too damning about ’ole Joe.
For the lawyers reading, I speculate that the above may be the case. I do not state it as fact.
@Airborne_Again
Relevant? Yes, I would think so, and so does the AAIB, since they mention the fact and reverse engineer the data. For an airplane which might be engaged in commercial traffic, I would have thought that ASD data would be available. Obviously a wrong assumption…
No example I’m afraid, I stopped dealing with certified POH equipped stuff a few years ago 
SEP don’t publish Accelerate Stop charts that I am aware of. SET do, although I never figured out how the PC12 operators (including some under multi crew SOPs) use Denham as the ASDR probably exceeds ASDA.
I would say that most Jets (citations are) operating under part-NCC doesn’t require that much. It’s a real problem for CJ with wet runway, where the landing performances in the POH are “to be considered as minimum” and cannot be trust depending on the runway contamination.
There is not a lot of information about the pilot, but with 31K hours, he’s potentially coming from the line where you have to trust you instruments for anything, and you have a clever machine that calculates the performances. He probably trust the machine too much.
greg_mp wrote:
He probably trust the machine too much.
And, pure speculation, his untrained “FP” too.
In the same vein, looking at the graphs et all, what would have happened if he would have done a line up from the grass, a static take-off applying/maintaining the proper power setting, all by himself… would he have made it, or not?
Speculation alright
I read in the report that there was a message that MAP is too high, but missed the “why” part. Why was that happening and what was the correct way to operate it?
arj1 wrote:
I read in the report that there was a message that MAP is too high, but missed the “why” part. Why was that happening and what was the correct way to operate it?
Looks like the old arrow IV turbo and his shitty fixed wastegate. Obviously it wasn’t briefed, and I doubt it would have saved the plane by doing 42, it’s just a hole in the cheese. Or killed them by giving the plane a bit more energy to lift of 10ft. Pure speculations…
