I’m not very familiar with the Embraer series, but on other airliners the take-off warning is linked to certain parameters, slats, flaps, etc, to be set.
To takeoff the thrust levers need to be advanced a certain amount, and to a certain position (FLX/MCT or TOGA on the Bus) or detent, and this delimits the takeoff phase. The alarm will sound if any of the parameters is not set. It would be “easy” to have the system compare actual position vs runway length available, and could even be linked to the PERF page.
Systems are in service right now that use the auto-brake function to slow the aircraft down to a predefined runway exit after landing, so having another safety net for takeoffs should/will be implemented.
Peter wrote:
When you start the ground run, yes.
So the pilot can abort the takeoff if something is wrong. There’s plenty of time between ground run start and V1 to abort the takeoff and stop the aircraft on runway.
Anyhow, I read the preliminary report Serbian Center for Traffic Accidents Investigation (equivalent of NTSB) and I learned few more facts:
- ATC warned the crew 4 times about insufficient runway but crew refused continuing taxi to intersection D6
- after the last warning crew spent 30 seconds for calculations and confirmed their intention for immediate takeoff from current position at intersection D5
- main landing gear smashed three rows of approach lights control boxes and main wheels lifted off from ground after asphalt end of runway leaving tyre marks in the mud
- nose wheel was lifted just before end of asphalt and it also hit approach lights control boxes
- left wing hit the pole of ILS control antenna and cut is some 90 cm deep
- left horizontal stabilizer suffered some 40 cm deep cut
- immediately after hitting the pole the rear part of fuselage had a brief contact with ground
- pieces of aircraft were found close to places were contacts with ground or ground equipment happened
- broken pole was found some 90 m from it’s original position in direction of aircraft movement
- pieces of pole and antenna were found stuck in cuts that aircraft suffered
- ILS is degraded from CAT 3 to CAT 1 until damage is repaired
Emir wrote:
- ATC warned the crew 4 times about insufficient runway but crew refused continuing taxi to intersection D6
- after the last warning crew spent 30 seconds for calculations and confirmed their intention for immediate takeoff from current position at intersection D5
This is just unbelievable. Who are these people ??
Emir wrote:
ATC warned the crew 4 times
ATC recordings, starts at 1:09:
and for those interested, The Aviation Herald provides some information on the accidents itself, links to vids as well as the airport’s diagram for a better understanding…
They weren’t even going to lose their place in the queue! ATC offered to let them back track on the runway if they wanted to!
Dan wrote:
has already happened countless times. Complacency, time pressure (slots, delays, flight duty times, etc), distraction, loss of SA (can happen on the ground too), or plain mistakes (wrong data input), have been found to be the driving factors.
You name it! I noticed at my local airport (single runway, only 3 intersections) most airliners now use an intersection to take off more frequently. The first 15 years since I’ve been around the scene, this was completely unheard of, and full length was always used. On bigger airports with a lot of intersections, I was used to seeing (and doing) it, but not at my smaller regional airport. Probably some office person discovered that it saves some money if extrapolated to the next 100 years.
ATC warned the crew 4 times about insufficient runway but crew refused continuing taxi to intersection D6
- after the last warning crew spent 30 seconds for calculations and confirmed their intention for immediate takeoff from current position at intersection D5
172driver wrote:
This is just unbelievable. Who are these people ??
Normal airline pilots. They were informed of the mistake, then went heads down to quickly figure out perf calcs if it would work. Perf calcs showed it will work. Problem was, it involved a non standard flap setting, which they missed. Boom. Textbook example of stress/rushing + non standard situation + can we fix this mistake quickly leading to accident.
Snoopy wrote:
They were informed of the mistake, then went heads down to quickly figure out perf calcs if it would work. Perf calcs showed it will work. Problem was, it involved a non standard flap setting, which they missed.
This will probably be additionally analyzed – whether they really ran performance calculation or not and if there was any configuration that allowed takeoff using 1273 meters of runway. I can’t say anything precise for particular aircraft because more-less I don’t know anything about it except what I read in report and of course I don’t have any idea how they do calculations but Embraer specifies 1432 m as takeoff distance for this type at TOW for 500 NM (LYBE→EDDL is 700 NM), full pax (which this flight was or was very close to with 106 POB), ISA (it was very close to it) and SL (LYBE is practically SL). So even if they didn’t tanker the fuel (because of cheaper fuel at LYBE) they were above these numbers. I hope the investigation will clarify this but I doubt that 1273 m was achievable in any configuration. Maybe I’m wrong but we’ll see.
Effectively this type of incident (Serbia’s Traffic Accident Research Center has rated the occurrence an accident)
It’s correctly defined as accident rather than incident based on substantial damage sustained to the aircraft.
