EuroFlyer wrote:
The one main item we can learn from that accident is to have very clear criteria to divert or turn around. And to stick to them, no matter what you may think up there.
Indeed, that is the problem with cloud-breaks unless you have a stop-loss and exit strategy it will be on pure hope & luck
In this report it’s highly unlikely the pilot was clear of clouds at the MAPT
However given that there is 10km between MAPT and THR (enough to keep anyone busy and long cross-country time and make weather observations on two points worthless), I can imagine a scenario where the pilot is clear of clouds at the MAPT, flies hopelessly to find the runway, can’t see it at the THR, resumed the missed segment, flies downwind, spot the runway on downwind (or by mistake some road between clouds), try to circle it and land, lose it in clouds, turned toward the missed segment and hit terrain on the climb…
Sorry it’s a long scenario but it gives some dynamics and quirks of “VFR flying in IMC” with no clear strategy aside from hope & luck that’s more likely to kill an experienced IFR pilot (cautious VFR pilot tend will LOC-I or safely call it off way before CFIT stage)
There are a couple of cloud breaking procedures in Austria like that one, i.e. St Johann, Wiener Neustadt, and others. They are essentially just meant to help you into the valley if the ceiling is high enough to proceed VFR after the MAP. In case of Zell the missed approach course diverts a couple of degrees to the right / south, which is perfectly fine to enable you to climb straight ahead in the valley, but it brings you a couple hundred meters to the south of the field and it is well possible that in very bad weather you don’t see the runway. He followed the MA first, but then, for some reason, apparently decided to give it a try anyway, resulting in a descent and turn into a wide left curve, which would have brought him to runway 26 if he had at least completed that. But for some reason he must have lost his faith in his own dangerous actions, and turned north again, where now was no valley any more.
I had a similar situation recently flying to LOAN / Wiener Neustadt, and I had perfect, sunny weather all the way until I realized the entire Austrian area, beginning in Salzburg to the East was covered in fog, and low clouds, which was worse than anticipated. I had Wien Schwechat set up as alternate, and as soon as I got the METAR of LOAN I knew the ceiling was below VFR minima, and immediately diverted to Schwechat. I didn’t want to mess around with my daughter with me.
The really tragic thing here is that the pilot seemed to have been a cautious pilot, and he was very cautious in his flight preparation the days before, calling Zell am See and weather service multiple times, trying to figure out if and when he could fly, eventually even prescheduling the flight to a day earlier because he anticipated the weather to be worse on Sunday.
The report says that maybe because of having successfully completed approaches to Zell am See in marginal weather before, he perhaps was overly confident to be able to do it again. Eventually he he drilled three holes into the proverbial cheese:
The first hole was to not immediately request vectors to Salzburg when he heard the METAR of LOAN up in FL 110. The second hole was to somehow try a VFR self assembled circle to land in the midst of the missed approach procedure. And the third hole, sealing his fate, was to doubt his actions and turn north.
This is exactly the kind of confirmation bias spiral that is so dangerous: each wrong decision spiraling you down into an even worse situation, until you are are out of options. It is a perfect example of how dangerous get-there-itis can be, and even worse, it can render all previously applied cautiousness futile.
The one main item we can learn from that accident is to have very clear criteria to divert or turn around. And to stick to them, no matter what you may think up there.
Snoopy wrote:
That is concerning. Imagine the horror you would bring to your family and kids. If you wouldn’t fly with your family, don’t fly alone!
I totally agree with this. My risk assessment is always the same and I try hard to divide emotions from reasoning. Risk assessment should be purely mental exercise, no emotions involved.
In fact, he seemed to not have much experience with landing in poor weather.
This should be a formal module in IR single pilot training. The course should devote a bit less time on the fetish of NDB holds, and a bit more time in knowing how to brief the approach lighting system and how to fly the transition from Category 1 DA to visual, with the relevant threats.
Not applicable to this case as it was a cloud break procedure. Wolkendurchstossverfahren
Ibra wrote:
Most airliners prohibit cancel IFR and fly VFR unless they have exemptions, so those comparaisons are rather moot…
I wasn’t referring to ifr/vfr ops but that there is no point to deviate from those procedures meant to protect you.
Snoopy wrote:
Vref wrote:
.For myself I know my risk assessment is different when I fly with pax and my own kids even more…….
That is concerning. Imagine the horror you would bring to your family and kids. If you wouldn’t fly with your family, don’t fly alone!
Common Snoopy…you are smarter than that!!! I will leave my further comments on this sad thread…..RIP
I would discount all the comments about the pilot being ‘conservative’ in his wx assessments and his flying. It’s human nature not wanting to diss someone who just died. Del mortuis nihil nisi bene. To my mind the extra training he – laudably – undertook may actually have been his undoing. He may very well have thought ’I’m better trained than the average, I can do this’ – until he couldn’t.
Presumably the fact that his two daughters were onboard was a big part of the decision making. There must have been a plan for an enjoyable day out with his children. It’s likely that he didn’t want to disappoint. That may have encouraged him to push further than he knew he should.
He might well have been a very capable and conservative pilot normally, and knew better, but on the day decided to push a bit further before giving up on a big day out. But that little bit further committed him to a path with tragic consequences.
I’m sure if the plan was just for a burger in the airport café, he’d have gone around at the MAP and gone somewhere else. But something made him push past it.
Snoopy wrote:
What could have helped him is the ILS at LOWS. There is a reason airline ops PROHIBITS any manipulation of procedures in databases. I have no experience with these self stricken waypoint experiments, but I don’t think one should even go near them, especially at locations like LOWZ.
Most airliners prohibit cancel IFR and fly VFR unless they have exemptions, so those comparaisons are rather moot…
I am sure the local guys used to flying VFR in LOWZ know well what they are doing, surely they operate just fine anywhere from 2200ft agl & 8km visbility to 500ft agl & 1.5km visbility which are way bellow the “required minima for the approach” and I hardly beleive they do that without GPS/FMS/Tablet waypoints
A vistor does not have that luxury and he should stick to the missed segment at the MAPt if no 2500ft agl & 10km visibility, if you want to get creative bellow these parameters at least ask some locals how they manage 500ft agl & 1.5km visbility over there (you may get surprised) or get few sunny visits or try in the sim yourself…
PS: in case it’s not obvious above, I am not talking about free-style IFR/IMC flying off-airways/approach or busting any rules or minimas here, just how to conduct a safe flight under plain legal VFR in class G in that valley, it’s not obvious to me it can be done on old school visual navigation (I really suck at this like most airliners pilots 
) and one will surely need his GPS/Tablet with some VFR waypoints to find his way (and put his cut-loss & exit strategy), I know it’s hard to admit you need a tablet/GPS for VFR but I have flown some valleys with some weather, you definetly need GPS/Tablet with some identifiable waypoints (e.g. roads, railways) to confirm you will stay alive…
Vref wrote:
A self created waypoint and leg from the AD reference point to the missed approach leg could have helped him
What could have helped him is the ILS at LOWS. There is a reason airline ops PROHIBITS any manipulation of procedures in databases. I have no experience with these self stricken waypoint experiments, but I don’t think one should even go near them, especially at locations like LOWZ.
Vref wrote:
I think indeed for instructors it would be good to have a look during IFR training and recurrent training and discuss a number of hypothetical holistic scenarios … what would you do if…in this cas, that case etc….including private …emotional state, kids on board..etc….For myself I know my risk assessment is different when I fly with pax and my own kids even more…….
Discussing is easy, but is it effective? I think there needs to be some muscle memory in the form of “OVC004 – in LOWZ – no way – I’ll divert to the easiest option”.
Vref wrote:
.For myself I know my risk assessment is different when I fly with pax and my own kids even more…….
That is concerning. Imagine the horror you would bring to your family and kids. If you wouldn’t fly with your family, don’t fly alone!
