Piper TriPacer – you can trim the elevator such that it’s impossible to get airborne. On a short airfield this could lead to overrruning the end at high speed into whatever obstacles lie beyond.
The TriPacer/Pacer elevator trim moves the whole horizontal stabilizer using a jackscrew assembly, and at full nose down the elevator can’t overcome it.
What is the main cause of a wing drop when stalling? I have experienced this of course but in my last 2 aircraft a stall has really been a non event (deliberate stall I should perhaps say) and recovery very straightforward.
Ideally the stall should start from the trailing edge near the root and work outwards. A rectangular wing tends to have this characteristic, while a Spitfire’s elliptical wing will stall evenly across the trailing edge. A tapered wing starts approximately mid wing, hence the semi tapered Warrior has stall strips near the wing root to provoke a benign stall.
The reasons for a wing drop at the stall might be:
Wing planform
Yaw at the stall, or cross controls
Engine torque
Use of flaps (this cancels the effect of wash out on the wing – where the outer wing has a lower AoA than the inner wing so that it stalls after the inner wing – as the inner wing now has a critical AoA similar to the outer wing)
The human reaction of trying to pick up a wing drop with aileron results in the wing suffering the wing drop, to move further into the stall regime as the aileron deflected down increases the camber of the outer wing, and lowers the critical AoA resulting in a deeper stall and consequently entering an incipient spin/auto rotation. The PARE mnemonic: Power idle, Aileron neutral, Rudder opposite, Elevator push is the correct emergency upset recovery for most aircraft – however the AFM applies. Some fuselage loaded, fast jets may require aileron for recovery.
Power loss on take off or initial climb.
I would suggest in a SEP that is the single most critical thing which can happen, especcially directly after take off. Loss of power in that phase is very likely to mean a crash landing and in quite some airports there is not a lot to go to if the power fails before safe altitude is reached. Equally, power loss at night or in IMC to the ground are quite likely to have adverse outcome.
- A mistake in GPS/VLOC switch for NAV guidance in NAV mode while flying near terrain in IMC
- Descend on autopilot above terrain by missing to ARM the set altitude capture while flying near terrain in IMC
- Flying above bare rocky mountain or city center and experiencing an engine failure
Admittedly these are not aircraft type specific but the first two above are both pretty scary, and easily done. I have done both a few times… but got away with it.
Counting down at 200 feet to go on ALT, checking it is armed and capturing should be part of training. The same applies when in NAV mode or APP. There is probably insufficient training on AP use in the IR.
The other gotcha is not monitoring speed in vertical speed mode, and ideally switching to speed at Vy or cruise climb if the AP has the capability. Some AP manuals recommend using CWS to establish trimmed climb or descent, then engaging VS.
One could modify the Northrop Chief Test Pilot comment on the Super Cub, that it has such few, simple systems, that it can barely kill you. The Pilot tends to be the biggest risk in a Super Cub.
I’m surprised that no one has mentioned the risk of failing to use / misusing carb heat. Carb ice seems to catch out low-hour pilots on humid days with depressing regularity. I had an instructor who was great in teaching when to apply it so that it became absolutely routine as a regular function and also part of the function of reducing the throttle beyond a certain point every single time, but she and her ilk clearly don’t teach all pilots of carburettor-equipments planes. I read too many accident reports where carb ice is implicated. It kills people.
I’m very pleased that I now fly a plane with a fuel-injected engine. Carb ice is now one rather major thing that I don’t to have to worry about in terms of the plane trying to kill me.
SR22: uncoordinated skidding turns and stalls in the traffic pattern, by inexperienced pilots who learned to fly in much more forgiving Warriors or Skyhawks.
SR22: uncoordinated skidding turns and stalls in the traffic pattern, close to the ground.
What is special about the SR22 which makes
“uncoordinated skidding turns and stalls in the traffic pattern, close to the ground”
particularly unsafe, compared to any other type?
I think this is getting completely ridiculous.
You may as well say
“SR22: flying upside down, 3ft above the runway, there is a risk of striking the end of the vertical stabiliser on the tarmac”
or
“SR22: flying with the chute deployed, not being able to achieve the required obstacle clearance on a SID, due to excessive drag”
although granted that one would be fairly type specific – in the certified world at least.
Counting down at 200 feet to go on ALT, checking it is armed and capturing should be part of training. The same applies when in NAV mode or APP. There is probably insufficient training on AP use in the IR.
How should this be handled? What I find difficult in this is that any distraction at the wrong moment can make one forget to check ARM, or (more likely) make one forget to watch the altitude as one is descending towards the preset altitude. I wonder how you make sure you are watching it.
The ARM should appear automatically whenever the altitude preselect is changed, but some button sequences can prevent it appearing despite the AP being in the VS or PIT mode and climbing or descending. And of course all GA autopilots (and possibly most/all airliner ones) will happily carry on for ever if you are at say 5000ft, set 8000ft on the preselect, and set -500fpm 
