skydriller wrote:
Not sure of the Aeroplane type but I seem to recall that in the incident in question they ran out of fuel?
It was an issue with the autopilot — not fuel exhaustion. Wikipedia.
Peter wrote:
A PhD is supposed to bring a contribution to knowledge.
Actually a PhD is supposed to demonstrate that the candidate has been trained as a scholar. That of course implies contributing to knowledge, but it doesn’t have to be profound.
My PhD owning GF informs me that a PhD is supposed to make an original contribution to knowledge.
In “humanities” this is not so difficult. You can get a PhD on the back of a purely empirical data collection exercise study, although you need to show an appropriate amount of hardship in trying to fit a theoretical framework onto the data. In “technology” a PhD is nowadays really hard; only the very brightest people produce something original, so a lot of them are done on the back of some big collaborative project where a pile of people get their PhDs.
I am at risk of an inferiority complex every morning when the post arrives. Mine is addressed to Mr and hers is addressed to Dr 
Fortunately I have other skills which are unique and valued, like changing light bulbs
A Masters, in comparison, just means you can google and then remove the page numbers from the stuff which you copied and pasted
That “crash when dealing with gear issue” is a fantastic example why focusing on preventing pilot error in itself is futile, and how simple fixes to catch and mitigate pilot errors helps.
In this accident, the mistake made by the distracted crew was switching the autopilot from altitude to CWS mode, most probably by accidentally leaning on / touching a button on the yoke. It does not matter if they were numpties or not – it is a mistake they made, and it can happen again.
The mechanisms to catch this mistake were, in these days, wholly inadequate.
Fortunately, the NTSB did NOT commission a study researching – to phrase it the same way as @MikeE – “why pilots continue to make mistakes [and fly perfectly serviceable aircraft into the ground] contrary to their training and instincts”, but researched “What can we do to prevent CFIT accidents”, and this led to GPWS and then EGPWS being mandated, and CFIT accidents dropped by 75%.
The sole focus on the question ("why do they keep making errors?’) simply is at least forty years out of date.
Peter wrote:
I have other skills which are unique and valued, like changing light bulbs
Hmm, how many Swedes are required to change a light bulb? 
Today a PhD is simply training (sausage factory style more or less) to become a scientist/researcher, when in previous times (not that long ago actually) it was all about defending some serious research you already had done.
And, in a probably futile attempt to be constructive, here my thoughts on what would be a better question
(1) What should be done to reduce the number of infringements – No. Infringements in itself are not a problem. But at least that one allows for other measures such as better communication, simplification of airspace etc.
(2) What should be done to reduce the number of accidents caused by infringements – No. There really are none, so that makes no sense.
(3) What should be done to reduce the risk of accidents caused by infringements – A bit better, since it reflects the reality, but falls short.
(4) What should be done to reduce the disruption caused by, and reduce the risk of accidents caused by infringement – that probably is realistic. This question includes preventing infringements from occurring in the first place, but this is only one thing of many to be considered.
The answer to (4) would probably include some element of reducing “pilot error”, but would include many other measures such as better ATC service in the vicinity of critical airspace, relaxing the rules about separation minima around infringing aircraft so they reflect the real risk, etc. To be fair to the UK CAA, in the past they did some of these things (listening squawks are one such example, although a poor substitute for something like “flight following” in the US).
Peter wrote:
My PhD owning GF informs me that a PhD
The reason why I got a “little” involved in this thread is my post Uni PhD had to be constructed in a very different way, and I was freqiently challenged as to the approach and title. It was for that reason that something didnt ring true about the approach that was being presented here – but who knows, it certainly doesnt mean all PhDs are supervised in the same way.
Airborne_Again wrote:
It was an issue with the autopilot — not fuel exhaustion. Wikipedia.
Im mixing it up with a different crash then… Im sure there was an incident involving an airliner that ran out of fuel because the crew got distracted.
I think it was DC8 or 707 era though??
Cobalt – it is a very good suggestion, but, I think still wide of the mark. We first should study the contributory factors that results in some pilots infringing, and then, what actions we can take to mitigate the contributory factors, and, then once an infringement has occurred, how to reduce the risk of a pilot infringing multiple times.
I have said it before, and will say it again, most pilots I believe infringe due to inadequate training and inadequate support by AT. In theory at least GASCo addresses a lot of these issues, but the message should have been delivered during initial training, and reviewed during the annual or two yearly review. For those that end up making a mistake it should be reviewed by the pilot’s local instructor if warranted exactly as it would be for any professional who makes a mistake in CAS performing his assigned duty.
What we have created is a money making enterprise that discourages safety, results in a lack of trust between regulator and pilot, is operated by a non regulated training organisation that is not subject to adequate scrutiny and which appears to engage staff who have no educational qualifications, all without any impact assessment or evidence based examination that their actions are either proportionate or effective.
Hasn’t the aviation human factors/ accident investigation services studied pilot error for many years? And as I understand it they long ago concluded that humans make mistakes and, would you believe it, pilots are human beings. Therefore in general the aviation industry has for many years concentrated not on how to stop pilots making mistakes but on what can be done to mitigate those errors whether they be by training, check lists, ergonomics, automation or whatever.
It appears to me that heavily penalising pilot error goes against this ethos. If the statistics etc that have been posted on this forum for UK airspace infringements are correct not only are the UK CAA methods inefectual they also go against the spirit of international aviation safety regulations as far as pilot error is concerned.
