Every single victim is one victim too much
That's exactly EASA's mindset that lead to exploding cost but less safety than a more risk statistics based approach the FAA seems to follow
That's exactly EASA's mindset that lead to exploding cost but less safety than a more risk statistics based approach the FAA seems to follow
Do you have any figures/evidence on which you base this statement? Especially the "less safety" bit? I think EASA has not been in operation long enough for any relevant statistics to be derived.
What Next
One thing I love about the supposedly more complex Cessnas is that they are not complex! There are remarkably few things that you MUST do for safety, and even fewer things to do on the runway.
It is a good example of design being a driver of safety.
From EASA's Annual Safety Review 2012, p. 48/52, we had 226 fatalities in GA in 2012. From the NTSB accident statistics, there had been 432 fatalities in N-Reg GA. N-Reg GA accounted for ~22 Million flight hours. EASA does not have statistics about EASA Reg GA flight hours. However, the European Personal Air Transport System Study p11 estimates that European GA accounted for 6 Million flight hours in 2006, versus 22 Million for N-Reg.
So for N-Reg, we have a fatality rate of 19.6/Million flight hours, while for EASA Reg we have 37.6/Million flight hours, so the EASA system has close to half the safety of the N-Reg system. QED.
Another article that does the comparison between N-Reg and D-Reg is here
One thing I love about the supposedly more complex Cessnas is that they are not complex! There are remarkably few things that you MUST do for safety...
It is a good example of design being a driver of safety.
I totally agree. The Citations (but also the latest built piston twins like the 303 and 421C) have matured over 40 years of constant production to a degree of being nearly fool-proof. Put every switch in "NORM" position and you almost need to be suicidal to get yourself killed in one.
...and even fewer things to do on the runway.
If all switches are on "NORM" the only thing you really have to do on the runway is to switch the pitot and AOA heaters on and the anti-ice if necessary. Unfortunately you can't do that earlier because there's a two minute time limit on the ground. Forgetting about transponder, strobes or landing lights will not kill you.
What's missing is a configuration warning so you could take off with trim and flaps in the wrong position. But again, unless you try to take off from a very short runway with the flaps up, this is not going to do much harm. But on landing it will warn you if you don't set flaps to land.
... p. 48/52, we had 226 fatalities in GA in 2012.
Yes, but: At least one half of these fatalities come from non-EASA regulated aviation (microlights, gliders, gyroplanes, ...). You can't blame EASA regulations for that.
It does not follow that more regulation makes things safer (especially regulation that costs people money). More regulation past a certain cost often has unintended consequences. For example, the regulator seems to believe aircraft owners have infinite money supply and don't seem to care about the cost of additional regulatory burden, but owners have to make tradeoffs - they are forced to pay to comply for some piece of new regulation, and as a tradeoff end up deferring some maintenance, or perhaps not installing a backup attitude indicator or whatever. Even if we exclude non EASA types then the FAA system results in at worst equivalent safety but at a fraction of the cost (which is still a much better situation). And in those FAA figures, they include microlights, gliders and gyroplanes - so in reality the FAA is still a lot better (and the FAA regulation of experimentals is a lot less intrusive and much less expensive to comply with than the LAA's requirements for the same in the UK).
On the original subject: when you go to a flight training organization you're often presented with this huge checklist for something straightforward like a C172. I did my multi rating (in the US) with an instructor who ran his own small flight school, and he used basically his airline's approach to check lists. The MD-11 he flies has a checklist that fits on one A4 laminated sheet and covers the things that will kill you - and he saw no reason why the checklist for a piston twin should be this huge tome of paperwork most flight schools use. The check list isn't a to-do list.
I have to confess I've nearly come to grief due to distraction during a preflight - I managed to leave the dipstick of a Cessna 140 on top of the engine. When I arrived at my destination, I got that awful sinking feeling when I got out and found the aircraft's underside was absolutely covered in oil - it looked like the entire contents of the engine had gone all over it. Fearing the worst - a serious oil leak - I opened the cowling and to my embarrasment (and relief) there was the dipstick still sitting on top of the engine. What looked like gallons of oil all over the aircraft turned out to be about two quarts.
Yes, but: At least one half of these fatalities come from non-EASA regulated aviation (microlights, gliders, gyroplanes, ...)
Not true. If you only use Aeroplanes and Helicopters in the EASA case (which is unfair, the US numbers also include Gliders and Balloons), then that is 124 fatalities, which is strictly more than half of 226. And EASA still comes out on top (meaning higher fatality rate) with numbers rigged like that.
And all this for 2-3 times more regulatory induced cost.
I've seen a couple of landing accidents caused by not knowing what to look for during pre-flight inspection. Its one thing to look at a tail wheel structure and mechanism, its another to know that it might look very little different when its broken. Simply wiggling it a little bit by hand, and knowing how to do that properly, provides a much better assurance that all is OK. Another example is vertical stabilizer attachment structure that is very lightly built, and vulnerable to corrosion. A little hands-on shake will tell a lot - and possibly prevent it departing the aircraft in flight.
In other words, know the parts of the particular aircraft that are vulnerable to damage, know how to check them before every flight, and do it. Don't just walk around looking at things you haven't taken the time to understand.
Another one from my POV is to practice aborting take-offs every once in a while, maybe with a cross wind. Some aircraft are directionally unstable when you pull the power at rotation speed.
Re 5 mile final... I've flown a 0.5 mile final, can't say I've ever flown one 10X that long :-)
