Just a tiny details, can have two PPL both the two are acting as PIC in PA28 N-reg, two pilots flying, two pilots manipulating controls, two pilots monitoring and both logging the flight…however, only one will be “safety PIC” who is responsible of aircraft safety in the whole flight (not sure if it’s even the PIC on FPL) and only one pilot manipulating controls at any given time
FAR is different from FCL/ANO where in PA28, one is PIC the other is PAX (or PUT with instructors)
I’ve come back to this one after a particularly extensive afternoon of old-thread-surfing.
What strikes me, re-reading it all, is how little the accident report really says about the stuff that matters. A UK AAIB report would have looked heavily at the question of who was PIC and all the stuff surrounding that about who was actually flying, who was in which seat, etc. All accident reports say they are not for legal use, not for apportioning blame etc, but this one almost looks as though it’s been created specifically to be able to avoid placing any blame.
I don’t buy the line about things being left out because they’re uncorroborated. The uncorroborated (even contradictory) statements of crew, passengers and witnesses are included in accident reports all the time….. but maybe not Canadian ones?
There was a flight plan filed, and under commander’s name it either said Simpson or Rutherford…..
Collaboration between two GA pilots sitting next to each other in the cockpit in a non-airline or non-commercial setting is no easy job. I remember creating as team captain simple SOPs and call outs for a team of pilots and navigators in air rallies like Coupe Breitling for my team members to adhere to. Even a simple call out on short final by the navigator and acknowledgement by the pilot flying with just a few check list items was hard to handle for most GA pilots in this manner as they were not used to doing it this way. When doing the training sessions, it went fine, but under stress during the race, most team members resorted to something they were used to and thus aborted the SOPs and call outs.
From here
BTW, what was the aftermath of Sam‘s crash? Did he get sued after all?
Airline cadet courses are typically intensive two month efforts with two weeks of CRM/orientation ground school and around 40 to 50 sectors of MCC SIM training (around 90-100 hours).
That’s how it should be but unfortunately is not always the case. I described only the typical free market 25 hour 3000€ mcc course
„of these training providers“ because that’s what most people encounter when they do these things privately. I don’t think it would he very beneficial for light GA flying single pilot or occasionally with a second pilot.
I understand what you mean but MCC as it is known is a „tick in the box“ to be able to apply for an airline job.
Yes there are these training providers, and white tail students may seek this type of course to tick the box in the cheapest fashion. Airline cadet courses are typically intensive two month efforts with two weeks of CRM/orientation ground school and around 40 to 50 sectors of MCC SIM training (around 90-100 hours). With this foundation you then go onto your scheduled type and line training.
It is also not tick the box as students can, and do, get washed out during this phase of training. The SIM phase is not a monkey say monkey do flow training, but involves a large proportion of abnormal and emergency condition MCC scenarios, including weather, aircraft and NOTAM conditions.
Sam_Rutherford wrote:
I believe that we were VMC when we crashed – but that the visual cues had disappeared
There was snow in the area, right? So this could well have been a white out phenomena like it happened in the Mount Erebus crash and several others I have heard of in the alps. VMC, loads of detail to the left and right but none straight ahead as there is a slope with white snow which melds seamlessly into the sky obscuring the horizon.
I have to say I was quite surprised at the accuracy of the Terrain pages even on my portable GPS, don’t think I wold like to fly in unknown terrain without it.
Your openness and willingness to share your experience is highly appreciated.
What I hope would be accomplished with some of the instruction for MCC applied to single pilot operations, is improved aeronautical decision making as mentioned by Snoopy.
It would be fair to say that this flight would not have gone beyond the pre start TEM brief in a multi crew context.
I understand what you mean but MCC as it is known is a „tick in the box“ to be able to apply for an airline job. It’s done in the cheapest 737 sim available and consists of mostly rote memorization of flows and callouts. Even if done in your own typical SEP it would be next to useless.
Think of it a bit like this: To untrain the up to now single pilot creature to want to always raise the gear by itself, and instead ingrain to „use“ the person sitting besides it as a new gear handle, by ordering said person to raise the gear. :) There is zero ADM present.There is quite some ADM present in CRM courses. Usually by discussing accidents in a special way (group play, additional scenarios, change of situation etc..).
Regarding TEM and a fictional flight it would be only a bit about multi crew and more about ops specs and limits and regulating each other without regard for personal/emotional considerations. Example: Old Captain Cowboy wants to be creative and fly low without headwind, „let’s go home kid“. Young First Officer Obvious has never heard of such an idea and dives into his ipad and produces
- egpws inop MEL due date expiry imminent so no dispatch
- minimum flight altitudes along route don’t check out against OM-A
- alternate airport and fuel planning insufficient
- myriad of other things.
Cap. Cowboy is like „Too much potential trouble, let’s go to the hotel and let the airline sort it out.“
@JasonC doesn’t have this „right seat luxury“ and you can tell by his response that he has a good single pilot ADM mechanism in place.
RobertL18C wrote:
What I hope would be accomplished with some of the instruction for MCC applied to single pilot operations, is improved aeronautical decision making as mentioned by Snoopy.It would be fair to say that this flight would not have gone beyond the pre start TEM brief in a multi crew context.
Well, single crew it would have been the following. After climbing to the planed cruise altitude of FL230-250, can we safely make Greenland with adequate reserves? If not we stay on the ground. I can honestly say that I would never have even considered flying half the trip at 2000ft; or 10000ft for that matter.
What I hope would be accomplished with some of the instruction for MCC applied to single pilot operations, is improved aeronautical decision making as mentioned by Snoopy.
It would be fair to say that this flight would not have gone beyond the pre start TEM brief in a multi crew context.
