Cobalt wrote:
Fair point. Typical airline SOPs for engine fire after V1 (with the engine failing or not) is to wait until established in safe climb (in Air France’s case, until reaching 400ft)
Yes, 400 or 500 ft is what usually is used even though I’ve seen SOP up to 1000 ft. With a Jet you don’t loose much doing that, as there is no drag from a failed engine comparable to props. Several pilots who went from MEP/MET to Jets said this was the most significant thing they had to unlearn. Leave everything alone until you are at safe altitude and then start fiddling is something a multi prop pilot really has trouble with.
Cobalt wrote:
The thing that made this lethal was a combination of the gear not coming up and the Engine 1 also failing.
Primarily it was that they had to rotate before Vr which is totally lethal to a delta wing. While one may argue that Marti saved the lives of the people on the 747 and of course was trying to save his own airplane, had that obstruction not been there and they would have continued to Vr and reached V2 then they would have stood a chance, at least initially. The shut down of No 2 at this point was also very bad as it was producing power urgently needed. Obviously the failure of the gear contributed as well. When engine 1 failed due to fuel starvation, that was it. There is no way a delta wing can recover from this kind of thing. If I remember right, what happened is that it pitched up and came down tail first.
All in all they were faced with “the mother of all emergencies” once they had comitted an overloaded airplane of questionable airworthiness to get airborne. One question never really answered was what would have happened if they had aborted. They would have overshot the runway end most probably but that might have been survivable rather than what happened next.
Fair point. Typical airline SOPs for engine fire after V1 (with the engine failing or not) is to wait until established in safe climb (in Air France’s case, until reaching 400ft). But the AFM called for immediate action (BTW – this is all in the report). In any airline crew, these things get drilled every six months, and the actions the crew takes are almost automatic.
The thing that made this lethal was a combination of the gear not coming up and the Engine 1 also failing.
Cobalt wrote:
If you read it, it will also debunk a lot of other nonsense spouted about this. People say the “crew shut down the wrong engine”… technically yes, engine 1 was surging, but engine 2 started surging and the engine 2 fire alarm went off. Which engine should they have shut down?
At this stage of take off, NONE. You don’t touch jet engines even if they are on fire while not in safe altitude. I recall reading the French original where Captian Marti in quired of the FE if he had shut down the engine, it sounded to me as if he was very surprised. They shut down one engine basically in ground effect and when the 2nd one failed (no 1) they ran out of power. Had engine 2 still be on, they might have continued for a while but I doubt strongly they would have accomplished a landing at Le Bourget.
Cobalt wrote:
disagreements about the relevance of these items varies.
It does indeed. Fact is, the decision to take off with significant overweight pretty much directly caused the accident. In how far the missing spacer or the decision to shut down Nr 2 was instrumental people will fight to the end of times.
Clearly, the Brits I got my stuff from were very angry people at the time because their very different operation of that airplane was killed on what they felt were phoney reasons and as some put it, French determination that if they had to stop, they would do anything in their power to make BA stop as well. You are right that one needs to see the statements made in this light. However, you can check out yourself, there is a movie with John Hutchinson, one of the more outspoken Concorde captains, who does a whole interview about this sordid affair and you will hear pretty much similar thoughts than I have voiced. As I said, many within BA were not in agreement with that report at all and very much hacked off at a crew who willingly started an illegal take off causing a disaster to end Concorde’s ops. My sources which I have read over the years basically all came out of BA’s Concorde crews.
Nevertheless, this is but one accident in the long row of irreguliarities. You say you agreed with the general gist of things and I guess that is where we have common ground. Concorde is history but the airline is not, therefore the systematical problems still exist which unfortunately was proven very drastically by the accident of AF447. BTW I was positively surprised by the report of that accident and felt that the BEA had changed it’s way big time. It remains to be seen if it stays that way, albeit in the hope we won’t have a chance to find out any time soon. Accident investigation circles I talk to don’t share my enthusiasm however particularly in the aftermath of the “investigation” into the German Wings disaster.
Which engine should they have shut down?
Below safe flying speed, the answer is None 
The fact that the plane is on fire is irrelevant.
In that case, I call BS on your “British Source”. They did indeed fly back with an aircraft that was not airworthy (in the sense that it had uninspected/unrepaired damage). But the retirement three years later was because they shut down the route because of lack of demand. And when they then tried to part it out for spares, it was TEN years later, the issues that made that difficult was extensive corrosion. And anyone who thinks that a puncture and subsequent leak in a tank is minor has no clue.
I recommend you apply the same caution, to your “British Source” that you apply to the BEA as a source.
If you want to read up on the history of tyre incidents and how they wear dealt with, I recommend you read….. the BEA report, pages 95 and following.
If you read it, it will also debunk a lot of other nonsense spouted about this. People say the “crew shut down the wrong engine”… technically yes, engine 1 was surging, but engine 2 started surging and the engine 2 fire alarm went off. Which engine should they have shut down?
You will also see that the BEA made negative comments on the state of the gear, the decision to take off with being overweight for the prevailing tailwind, so this was hardly a whitewash / cover-up, although disagreements about the relevance of these items varies.
Cobalt wrote:
The incident happened in 1979, F-BVFD was withdrawn in 1982 and dismantled only 10 years later. The damage history may have been the reason that this particular aircraft was chosen to be retired, though.
You are right, which I suppose makes it worse. I did not realize it took 3 years for them to realize that the airplane was not airworthy after they initially repaired it. Need to talk to some folks about this one, basically what I was told by people involved with Concorde on the British side was that after the accident it was flown and in a subsequent check found not repairable and scrapped without much ado. Did not realize the time frame involved. Apparently after they discovered the full extent in 1982 it was stored and used for spare parts until it was eventually scrapped, which, given it is a Concorde, is also quite weird as many museums would have killed to have whatever was left of it. My contacts in Britain suggested that it was scrapped so that nobody could have a closer look at it anymore.
Cobalt wrote:
You say they kept quiet about the Dulles tyre burst incident
Not about the incident itself but about the extent of the damage. Again the information I had from the British side is that they knew nothing about that until after Gonesse other than there had been a leak caused by tyres. They assumed it was minor, how major it had been they were gobsmacked when that came to light.
The question then also is that if there were already AD’s about the tyres why they did not prevent Gonesse from happening. Obviously nobody had thought that anyone would try to take off the way that crew did nor had any idea about the consequences.
Personally I take everything which comes out of BEA these days with a bucket of salt particularly if it concerns any French made airplane or French airline. I guess they did learn some things from those accidents and quietly implemented changes where neccessary but it appears quite clear to me that not everything which should have has been brought to light
While I share your views about the poor safety record of Air France and the likely cultural issues in that airline that might be the cause, I don’t think you have your facts straight.
You say they were “destroying the airframe […after an incident…] before anyone could find out what they had done”. Not true. The incident happened in 1979, F-BVFD was withdrawn in 1982 and dismantled only 10 years later. The damage history may have been the reason that this particular aircraft was chosen to be retired, though.
You say they kept quiet about the Dulles tyre burst incident which was the first one where a tyre burst caused damage to fuel tanks. Not true. It was reported to the BEA, and led to serveral AD’s related to the tyres.
VinceC wrote:
That kind of narrows it down to who the real culprits were…..
If Air France or any French made airplane or interests is involved, don’t belive one word of any report the BEA might release.
Air France to me is a total no-go unless I am in a position where I have no choice, I won’t fly them out of principle. Their track record may be above some African or Asian operators, but the accidents they have caused always showed a complete lack of respect and skill operating airplanes the way they should be. And that is only what made it past the political players at the BEA and the government.
- Crashlanding a Concorde in Dakar and not telling anyone about it, flying it home and once they found that it was actually unairworthy destroying the airframe before anyone could find out what they had done…
- keeping quiet about the findings of the Concorde incident at Dulles, which was a carbon copy of the Paris one with the difference that the initial damage was less and allowed them to return
- Gonesse, where a Concorde was crashed due to sheer disregard for just about any good flying practice and massive crew and technical error
- Habsheim….
- AF447, does anyone really need a more incapable crew?
- Toronto
- can’t remember where that 747 was destroyed by an overrun
and so on…
I don’t think the Soviets were much more secretive and manipulative about their accidents… but at least they kept their pilots at a very high standard (which they needed in that environment).
Super movie – thanks for posting it. I’ve just watched it whole.
I was privileged to be on one of the last flights, in 2003.
Perhaps a little UK-centric, but an interesting and at time humorous documentary. I apologize if this is something that most or all of you have already seen.
Isn’t it just an amazing machine.
