The certification regime in aviation is extremely strict and yet there are certified solutions that are so bad that I wonder how they passed certification.
Here are my favorites:
1) Dual magnetos. Completely takes out the idea of redundancy and independence. One single box with connected plastic wheels and lots of brittle parts. A million scenarios where one side kills the other and the engine is out. Braindead and unsafe, an insult to the certification regime. The single worst thing about my aircraft (and the TB20/21).
2) Fuel selectors outside the direct field of vision of the pilot. Very bad user interface design, encouraging deadly mistakes for no reason.
What else is there?
The SR22s Circuit Breaker Panel. It’s below your right knee and if you’re not really into Yoga you have no chance to see the CBs … You have to find the right one by counting rows (3) and lines (about 10) with your fingers and it’s hard to find the right one … especially under stress.
Manual Carburator Heat controls. These things should either be on all the time or foolproof automatic (my 1979 Citroen CX had such a system using a bimetal driven valve. One of the few components that never failed in 18 years). Almost every second engine failure is due to carb icing…
Automatically deployed slats, flaps and landing gears. These things have killed far more people than they saved.
Narco avionics.
Aircraft with only one door exit.
I guess the reason is that certification means lots of paperwork and there is the belief that when everything is documented then people will have paid attention to every detail and the product has been created right.
At the very end the only safety in that is CYA (cover you behind…), which can be huge incentive to people who are in certain positions.
And still many other fields look up to aviation due to the perceived high standards and people are trying to do what aviation is doing right. Hmmm?
The KFC225 autopilot
However, to be fair to Honeywell, plenty of other certified avionics turned out to be unreliable. Certification is nothing to do with the item actually working for even the duration of a single flight.
I agree about the single door. Not only is it unsafe, but it makes getting in and out so obviously difficult, without damaging the seats which everybody has to climb over.
Cirrus spin characteristics which were mitigated by the inclusion of BRS.
Split flap systems which could result in asymmetric flap deployment.
Narco – yes I agree :)
Any fuel system that wholly needs a second electrical pump in the event of a mechanical failure.
Autopilots that will stall an aircraft because they’re trying to maintain altitude.
Any aircraft type that has been certified with carburettor engines since the introduction of fuel injection.
Most fuel gauges, including associated float senders.
Cirrus spin characteristics which were mitigated by the inclusion of BRS.
Sorry, but that’s the most stupid legend of GA. And it was invented by the Columbia Marketing department. I could even tell you the name of the person who made it up …
THe SR22 was spun 60 times for EASA certification and it recovered … well … like any other airplane of the class. Only that it’s uch harder to get it into a spin.
Err, that’s not quite true. have a look at http://www.peter2000.co.uk/aviation/misc/3-105960-Cirrusstall-spinreport.pdf
Notably:
Cirrus has determined that the probability of the typical general aviation pilot properly applying the SR20 recovery controls to assess if the aircraft has permanently departed controlled flight is likewise low. While a small percentage of Cirrus pilots may be able to successfully recover from an inadvertent spin, Cirrus contends that the far larger portion of pilots would not do so in a surprise departure spin situation. Cirrus has accordingly concluded, as a result of the further extensive flight test conducted pursuant to the JAA Study Group direction in April 2000, that in an inadvertent spin entry, time and altitude is too critical to allow for any pilot reaction except the simple and quick process of reaching for the CAPS handle and activating the system. Cirrus believes it is better to accept some airframe losses through CAPS activation when the airplane could have been flown away following a successful recovery, in order to save the lives of the far larger number of pilots who would not be able to successfully execute a spin recovery.
I know that document (and theres many other documents o that topic including the spin report EASA made when they tested it,
The interpretation of the document is wrong. Cirrus did not have to do the whole spin test program (and save a lot of money and time) – because they argued that (for the average pilot anway) the “recovery” by CAPS is much safer. So they were spared the complete spin test program and got the certification anyway.
EASA’s spin tests proved that the recovery from a spin is normal.
From the FAA’s summary (in that document)=
It is our hope that other manufacturers will see the safety merits of this approach to preventing sta ll/spin accidents and follow Cirrus’s lead so that the FAA can begin to see a reduction in this significant cause of fatal accidents.
