Thanks Guillaume, had example 1 but not example 2 !
Malibuflyer wrote:
After realizing this, the controller saved the airtime on the frequency by no longer issuing such advice. That is understandable.
Sorry to be nitpicking, but the report says there was a change of controllers during the approaches, and the new controller did no longer issue this warning.
MedEwok wrote:
Sorry to be nitpicking, but the report says there was a change of controllers during the approaches, and the new controller did no longer issue this warning
Sure – it’s pure speculation but I could imagine that during the handover the first controller mentioned to the second one that the pilot is not reacting to such hints anyways…
My sincere condolences to families and friends of the dead crew.
There is something I don’t understand: the dead pilot was, by all accounts neither stupid, nor inexperienced, nor idle, nor careless, nor a habitual risk-taker/corner-cutter.
So how on earth did he end up flying near a major airport without ADS-B In or other means to verify the position and type of other traffic? The cost of that is either zero or peanuts, depending on whether you just want the FR24 belt, or GDL39 (etc.) braces as well.
Never mind what info ATC is supposed to provide about wake turbulence. That’s completely irrelevant. Why would any PPL, even if he did fit one of the above categories, put so much trust in an ATCO whose backside is safely planted on terra firma as to kill himself in wake turbulence?
From Dave’s past posts I would say he had ADS-B IN of some sort.
This is what he would get from FR24 at Dubai International, for $ 0.00
Is there any pilot alive who doesn’t make use of such tools when flying into a busy airport?
He may had some alert, but you usually disregard these alerts while on final because either it is inhibited or it is giviing your alert of planes that are on the ground.
After 9 approaches, he may also get too much of these and may have given less importance.
Ok, I’ve skimmed through the report…
3.4 Contributing Factors to the Accident
The Investigation identified that the Commander’s decision to reduce the self-separation from preceding air traffic during approaches to runway 30R, and wind conditions in which the wake vortices from the approach path to runway 30R drifted across into the approach path to runway 30L, were contributing factors to the Accident.
It may seem harsh, especially to those who knew the pilot, but repeatedly ignoring ATC wake turbulence warnings and repeatedly flying approaches at less than half the recommended WT separation (which may not always be completely safe) looks worthy of a Darwin award.
It’s very sad. One can accept people killing themselves having fun doing aerobatics, or float flying, or mountain landings, or flying rotorcraft, but it’s hard to come to terms with determined rule-breaking by an ex. RAF guy who just decided to risk the lives of his work colleagues – for nothing.
Jacko wrote:
There is something I don’t understand: the dead pilot was, by all accounts neither stupid, nor inexperienced, nor idle, nor careless, nor a habitual risk-taker/corner-cutter.So how on earth did he end up flying near a major airport without ADS-B In or other means to verify the position and type of other traffic? The cost of that is either zero or peanuts, depending on whether you just want the FR24 belt, or GDL39 (etc.) braces as well.
Root cause was not a lack of situational awareness. Therefore ADS-B discussion has nothing to do with the case.
One can assume that the pilot was fully aware of the traffic in front of him (and saw it) but underestimated the risk of wake turbulence.
There is something I don’t understand: the dead pilot was, by all accounts neither stupid, nor inexperienced, nor idle, nor careless, nor a habitual risk-taker/corner-cutter.
Read post 117 and 128.
Hint: self separating to get the job done is just the last puzzle tile in this accident.
