Don’t think many ATC will offer you a visual approach in busy controlled airports (e.g. outside IFR flight paths and circle to land) things will get hectic when you decide to go around/missed, also I am assuming one has to still adhere to standard visual pattern and MSA height/Rate1 turns while IFR on visual approach?
Emir wrote:
so ATC was able to see that separation was below recommended limits.
The accident report states that information regarding that separation was given during the first five approaches but the pilot obviously did not change anything based on that information. Therefore it was no longer issued for the following approaches.
From my POV the controller was not obliged to do the separation and experienced in the first 5 approaches, that giving such informatory advise is useless as the pilot does not react to them. Therefore it is understandable, that the controllers at some point in time ceased to give them.
Ibra wrote:
Don’t think many ATC will offer you a visual approach in busy controlled airports (e.g. outside IFR flight paths and circle to land) things will get hectic when you decide to go around/missed, also I am assuming one has to still adhere to standard visual pattern and MSA height/Rate1 turns while IFR on visual approach?
I am just pointing out that the flight could be conducted under IFR with one or more visual approach segments where the pilot is solely responsible for terrain clearance, there is no need for a “pattern” to be flown at least as far as most countries are concerned 
. What the rules are in that country I don’t know, but as it is there own rules in any case it might be appropriate to vary them under certain circumstances.
the flight could be conducted under IFR with one or more visual approach segments where the pilot is solely responsible for terrain clearance
This would not be possible in EASA-land. The typical profile of a calibration flight would infringe all obstacle clearance requirements necessary to establish an IFR procedure. The calibrator would never be able to fly the mission because ATC would need to vector it all over the place for separation. The easiest way for ATC and the calibrator is to let him fly whatever he has planned (and briefed with ATC) and adapt the arrival sequence as much as possible. This works only when VFR in class D or lower…
The report states that in emails the PIC hinted he can fly tigther and make it work. The question should be why this was necessary and became normalization of deviance leading to the crash.
airways wrote:
This would not be possible in EASA-land.
How so Visual Approaches under the IFR are allowed in EASA-land are they not? Obviously these flights are closely coordinated with ATC, not the least because you would hope that terrain alerts might be generated along with lateral navigation might not be within expected norm.
Ted wrote:
I am just pointing out that the flight could be conducted under IFR
That’s kind of a weird discussion, as p.6 (and p.34, etc.) of the accident report clearly states “the flight crew operated under visual flight rules (VFR)”.
Btw. - one fact that might be interesting but hasn’t been discussed yet (at least not on the last 4 pages):
The Plane causing the wake turbulence was not on the approach to the same runway but to a parallel one. Might also have contributed to the fact that th PIC underestimated the danger…
I don’t think you understand how calibration flights work. They don’t just come in for a landing by the seat of their pants. They fly multiple profiles in the vertical plane, depending on the equipment being calibrated, eg PAPI, ILS CAT 3,… and they fly it to very close tolerances. If ATC needs to take them off their profile then they can start that run all over again. Maybe a lighting calibration can be flown with more comfortable margins, I’m not familiar with the precise procedure.
A visual approach is not serving any purpose here.
That’s kind of a weird discussion,
It is not a discussion just pointing something out, I don’t wish to comment on the accident itself.
airways wrote:
I don’t think you understand how calibration flights work.
I am certain I don’t. But I guess is requires flying an existing procedure, not only exactly but also at limits and also outside of the protected areas. I am sure there are many very important details that relate to obstacle clearance that must be checked. It seems a more correct statement is that is requires VMC.
They could be given a visual approach after the OM or at anytime during a normal approach? If they were VFR I would not be surprised the were actually instructed to fly the approach in first place. Many ways to actually handle this sensibly.
