DA62 G-MDME calibration flight down - Dubai

Peter wrote:

Page 48 has some interesting real data on wingtip vortex descent rate: 1m/sec i.e. 200fpm. This is less than the 300-500fpm often posted.

I wonder if airliners would carry such wake/wind-sheer RADAR equipment onboard in the future?

Sadly the main risk factor in those calibration flights in good weather is wake turbulence from heavy metal, that is it nothing less nothing more !

Other secondary factors for loss-of-control and collision are no different from any low level flying (e.g. airshow display, aerobatics or just personal low fun over the runway)

RIP crew

Graham wrote:

“the Copilot was probably concerned about the aircraft being too close and too low but did not have the necessary assertiveness to challenge the Commander

You mean a bit like Prince Charles severely damaging a 146 but the Commander not wishing to challenge HRH?

Another example of the frequent divide in commercial ga ops between „what’s written in the books“ and „what’s done in practice“ to make money.

The Safety Management System (Nominated Postholder Safety/Quality) should have banned „self spacing“ during calibration flights.

The PIC should have insisted on wake turbulence separation. For reasons we can only guess, he didn’t. I don’t think his decision making is questionable. That’s too easy to say from the comfy couch at home.

I’ll put it this way: this accident is a reminder for commercial pilots that „good intentions“ (especially if they involve saving your employer time and money) can cost the ultimate price.

1.17.8 Operator safety management system
The Operator had established a safety management system (SMS) which was described in the FCSL SMS Safety Management Manual dated February 2017. The manual described that the company directors held overall responsibility for implementation of the SMS and final accountability for all safety issues.
Section 3.4 − Aviation Safety Policy and Objective, stated:
“The Company recognizes that aviation is a potentially high risk industry requiring a positive approach to the management of safety. We are committed to the introduction of a formal SMS to enable the identification [of] hazards, the analysis of risks and implementation of appropriate defences.”
According to the Safety Management Manual, the safety officer was to report to the flight inspection manager. The safety officer responsibilities included facilitating the risk management process with its hazard identification, risk assessment, risk mitigation, and the monitoring of corrective actions implementation. A hazard, incident and occurrence reporting system called
Investigation Final Report No AIFN/0007/2019, issued on 13 May 2020 30

‘flight inspection observation note’ (FION), was utilized to collect reports from staff. FION was part of the risk management process.
During his interview, the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) stated that he lacks expertise on the safety management process and therefore was not actively involved. Instead, he “delegated his safety responsibilities and accountabilities to a manager”, who was acting as a safety officer and as a flight inspection manager.
In the interview, it was noted that the CEO believed that he did not have any requirement to attend SMS training and that he was not accountable for the SMS, as he had delegated his SMS accountabilities and responsibilities.
The SMS Manual contained processes designed to provide staff with the relevant level of SMS training. Section 5.2.7.2 − Training needs, described the level of training as follows:
“Corporate safety training for all staff
a) Management safety responsibility
b) Operational personnel
c) Aviation safety specialists.”
Section 5.2.7.4 − Safety Training for Management, stated that the management team will attend an external safety management course.
ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices identified that, depending on the size, structure and complexity of the organization, the accountable executive may be the CEO, or the chairperson of the board of directors. The identified executive with safety accountabilities, irrespective of other functions, has the ultimate responsibility and accountability for the implementation and maintenance of the SMS. These accountabilities and responsibilities cannot
8
The CEO was a member of the company board of directors since 2005. He was appointed as CEO in January 2019, when the position was established. In his position as member of the board of directors or as the CEO, he did not involve himself in the regulatory requirements of the operation or the safety management processes. He considered his “primary role as a financial director of the organization.

This was a single pilot operation and “co-pilot” was (as I understand it) a calibration equipment operator. During different flights they were probably exchanging the roles to get rest or equalize duty time but I don’t think any CRM procedure was in place. Moreover, I don’t know how it could’ve been implemented in single pilot operation.

However, it’s interesting that in operation, which is technically IFR flights under ATC surveillance, ATC is almost completely absolved from responsibility because they issued advisory warnings about wake turbulence.

Emir wrote:

it’s interesting that in operation, which is technically IFR flights under ATC surveillance,

Why do you think so? The accident report states that the flight was VFR and it would actually be extremely difficult (to non feasible) to do such a flight under IFR as to test the lights (e.g. Papi) you need to consciously fly to and beyond the boundaries of a regular IFR approach – you can never check if you really see “4 red” if you are more than 30’ below glide path, as you will never get there under IFR.

Why do you think so? The accident report states that the flight was VFR and it would actually be extremely difficult (to non feasible) to do such a flight under IFR as to test the lights (e.g. Papi) you need to consciously fly to and beyond the boundaries of a regular IFR approach – you can never check if you really see “4 red” if you are more than 30’ below glide path, as you will never get there under IFR.

Correct, @Malibuflyer. Calibration flights file VFR because they want the flexibility of VFR, and with that flexibility comes greater responsibility.
There is no way vectoring can achieve the flightpath that these pilots need to fly. Most of the time (in case of navaid calibration) the calibration starts already when on an arc that intercepts the final approach track/required radial.

airways wrote:

Calibration flights file VFR because they want the flexibility of VFR, and with that flexibility comes greater responsibility.

Because IFR flights don’t go out of max deviations on flight & navigation needles but on VFR it is your game not ATC one

Thank for correcting me. Still radar surveillance had clear picture of separation between this flight and CAT traffic operating on active runway, so ATC was able to see that separation was below recommended limits.

Malibuflyer wrote:

The accident report states that the flight was VFR and it would actually be extremely difficult (to non feasible) to do such a flight under IFR as to test the lights (e.g. Papi) you need to consciously fly to and beyond the boundaries of a regular IFR approach

That still does not preclude IFR. Why not a visual approach under IFR? Perhaps not permitted in this jurisdiction, however in any case it is their trains set so someone could allow it.