DA62 G-MDME calibration flight down - Dubai

Malibuflyer wrote:

Btw. – one fact that might be interesting but hasn’t been discussed yet (at least not on the last 4 pages):

The Plane causing the wake turbulence was not on the approach to the same runway but to a parallel one. Might also have contributed to the fact that th PIC underestimated the danger…

These runways are too close to each other and the approach path should be considered as the same path for both runways.

I know nothing about the normal traffic flow into Dubai, but in most / all other large airports in the world, early evening is rush hour. As they were calibrating lights, might it not have made more sense to do these flights during some slow / dead time? I know, hindsight form my desk, but still….

The takeaway here is to be even more careful with WT. At least around here (L.A.) we constantly mix with the heavy iron and the controllers are very attuned to that. Until about a year ago (the flightpaths were changed slightly then), one of the KLAX approaches went directly above one of the normal eastbound routes from KSMO. On more than one occasion SoCal App vectored me out of the way of an A380 that was overtaking me a couple of thousand feet above.

So, re-reading Snoopy’s posts and reading between the lines of the Report’s conclusions, Mr Phillips is alleged to have deliberately risked and sacrificed the souls on board his aeroplane by ignoring common wake turbulence precautions, under pressure from his British employer to whose unsafe custom and practice the UK CAA turned a blind eye?

Is that common in commercial aviation elsewhere in Europe?

Who was the UK CAA head of department whose failure to “exercise effective oversight of the Operator … resulted in the Operator providing commercial aviation services without adequate regulatory involvement”?

172driver wrote:

I know nothing about the normal traffic flow into Dubai, but in most / all other large airports in the world, early evening is rush hour. As they were calibrating lights, might it not have made more sense to do these flights during some slow / dead time?

I think you will find that for most of the middle east that is the quiet time. Most flights are late night, early morning, until about midday.

Regards, SD..

When issuing warnings about wake turbulence, ATC does not and is not required to consider wind. But I would imagine that the commander in this case did just that, and maintained a mental picture of the path of the wake vortices. I cannot believe he dismissed the risk of flying into a vortex, I rather think he may have felt quite certain about its position – but made a mistake.

You can’t localise a vortex that easily even when you know the position of the heavy aircraft and the wind, the vortex path shown in the report using LIDAR is way different from the textbooks in terms of extent and rate of descent and in a calibration flight you just fly the calibration path no? so there is no mental picture of a tactical WT avoidance just a timing decisions?

Emir wrote:

These runways are too close to each other and the approach path should be considered as the same path for both runways.

Absolutely correct from a legal POV. The accident, however, has much to do with the mental picture and the risk assessment in the mind of the pilot. And for that one could at least imagine that it makes a difference if you hear that another plane is on the same or on a different approach – even though this difference is not justified by facts.

What would cause the pitch-down?

The wake vortex should produce a roll, only.

Any significant amount of roll will cause a pitch down/descent, especially from already nose down approach attitude